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State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Perspectives
on Proposals for Change and Their Constitutionality
Kendall L. Houghton∗ and Walter Hellerstein∗∗
Over the past few years, an enormous amount of attention has
been devoted to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic
commerce,1 possible solutions to those problems,2 and, more recently, the question of whether there is a “problem” at all.3 We have
both been, and continue to be, deeply involved in the debate over
these issues4—a debate that has sometimes generated more heat than
light. We view this forum as furnishing us an opportunity to take a
step back from the fray and to offer our views not only on the critical
issues that are dominating the debate but also on the process by
which that debate is being conducted.
∗ Partner, Alston & Bird LLP; A.B., Harvard, 1986; J.D., New York University,
1989; L.L.M., Emory University, 1994.
∗∗ Professor of Law, University of Georgia; A.B., Harvard, 1967; J.D., University of
Chicago, 1970.
1. We could cite countless law review articles for this proposition, but, in the finest
academic tradition, we choose to cite our own. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Internet Tax Freedom Act Limits States’ Power to Tax Internet Access and Electronic Commerce, 90 J. TAX’N 5
(1999) [hereinafter Internet Tax]; Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce,
52 TAX. L. REV. 425 (1997); Kendall L. Houghton, The Federal Legislative and NTA Tax
Project Initiatives on Electronic Commerce Taxation, J. MULTIST. TAX’N AND INCENTIVES,
Sept./Oct. 1998, at 148; Kendall L. Houghton, Where Electronic Commerce Is Concerned, Caveat Emptor (Let the Buyer Beware): An Analysis of Ongoing Efforts to Define State and Local
Taxation Policy, 97 ST. TAX REP. 8 (1997).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, The Sky Is Not Falling: Why State and
Local Tax Revenues Were Not Significantly Impacted by the Internet in 1998, 17 ST. TAX
NOTES 43 (1999).
4. Before joining Alston & Bird, Kendall Houghton was general counsel to the Committee on State Taxation, the preeminent state tax organization representing the interests of
business taxpayers. In that capacity, she spoke and wrote frequently about issues involving state
taxation of electronic commerce. She subsequently cochaired the National Tax Association’s
Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project (“Project”) discussed infra Part II.A.
Walter Hellerstein was a member of the Project’s Steering Committee and was actively involved in drafting various Project reports. He has also testified as an expert before the Advisory
Commission on Electronic Commerce discussed infra Part II.B. Both authors also testified
before Congress on legislation that became the Internet Tax Freedom Act. See Internet Tax
Freedom Act: Hearing on H.R. 1054 Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
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Part I of this article provides an overview of the issues raised by
state taxation of electronic commerce. Part II examines the debate
over these issues, and suggestions for their resolution, within the
framework of the National Tax Association’s Communications and
Electronic Commerce Tax Project (“NTA Project” or “Project”)5
and the proceedings before the Advisory Commission on Electronic
Commerce (“ACEC”).6 Part III considers the federal constitutional
limitations on congressional power to implement proposals addressed to state taxation of electronic commerce.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic commerce––the use of computer networks to facilitate
commercial transactions involving the production, sale, and distribution of goods, services, and intangible property––has significant implications for state and local taxation, as it does for just about everything else.7 Electronic commerce provides the environment in which
digital products or services are transferred and sold. These products
and services include text, sound, video, and other content that can
be expressed as series of ones and zeros. Electronic commerce also
opens up new avenues for marketing traditional goods and services
directly to consumers. It creates similar opportunities for businessto-business transactions involving both digital and nondigital products and services. Indeed, American companies currently make billions of dollars worth of sales to one another over the Internet, several times the consumer retail total, and it is estimated that businessto-business sales could exceed one trillion dollars in the near future.8
Unless virtually all predictions are wrong, the growth of electronic commerce will continue to produce a dramatic expansion of
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. Most of the text of this Introduction is taken directly from NTA, Communications
and Electronic Commerce Tax Project Final Report (visited Mar. 8, 2000)
<http://ntanet.org/>, at 1-9 [hereinafter NTA Final Report], which the authors were instrumental in drafting.
8. In 1998, American companies had $43 billion worth of sales to one another over the
Internet, five times the consumer retail total, and it is estimated that business-to-business sales will
reach $1.3 trillion, or 9.3% of corporate America’s purchases, within four years. The Net’s Real
Business Happens .Com to .Com, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1999, at C1, col. 3-5, & C6, cols. 3-6 (citing statistics from Forrester Research, Cambridge, Mass.).
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commercial transactions occurring through digital networks. The advent of electronic commerce raises a number of questions as to
whether and how state and local taxes, particularly state and local
sales and use taxes, should be applied to such commerce. These
questions include:
• whether the existing state and local sales and use tax system is compatible with an electronic commerce environment;
• whether electronic commerce should be taxed at all considering the difficulty of taxing such commerce;
• whether not imposing or collecting tax on electronic
commerce will undermine the sales and use tax base and create inequalities between sales of equivalent goods and services depending on the form or mode of delivery;
• whether the multiplicity of, and inconsistency among, existing state and local use tax laws creates an undue burden on
sellers and purchasers in an electronic commerce environment, and, if so, whether it is possible to create greater consistency in state and local sales and use tax laws to facilitate
application and administration of such laws in an electronic
environment; and
• whether, and under what circumstances, vendors should
be required to collect sales and use taxes where they have no
physical presence in the state in which their product or service is delivered, assuming a state of delivery can be identified,
and where, in some circumstances, vendors may have little or
no information regarding their customers’ location.
A. Attributes of Electronic Commerce with Significant Implications for
State and Local Taxation
Electronic commerce increases the ability of sellers, including
those who could not previously sell to a national and international
market, to engage in interstate and international commerce through
direct interaction with potential buyers. From the standpoint of state
and local taxation, such direct interaction enables a wider range of
vendors to make sales to purchasers and conduct other business activity in a state without establishing a physical presence there, since
they communicate with their customers solely by electronic means.
11
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Another key attribute of electronic commerce with important
implications for state and local taxation is that, in principle at least, it
allows for provision of digital products and services from remote locations and the receipt of such products and services at remote locations. Regardless of where digital products or services may be produced, they can be transmitted quickly from any location in the
world. Such digital products or services can then be offered from
that location to customers in any other location in the world that is
capable of receiving and storing digital signals.
Electronic commerce also provides enhanced opportunities for
engaging in anonymous transactions, i.e., transactions that occur in a
manner in which the seller does not know who the buyer is or where
the buyer is located. Such transactions may involve the transfer of
digital products or services with no verifiable individual or geographic identifiers. They may also involve the payment for such
products or services with electronic cash, which likewise contains no
verifiable individual or geographic identifier.
We have alluded above to some of the key issues that electronic
commerce raises for state and local sales and use taxes. Many of these
are variations on issues that have long existed with regard to the sales
and use tax. The emergence of electronic commerce magnifies the
impact of these issues, making them more significant.
1. Collection responsibility for state and local use taxes
The circumstances under which an out-of-state vendor may be
required to collect a use tax that is due to the state from the customer (on products sold to customers within the state) has been the
focus of legal and political controversy in the context of mail-order
and other remote selling for over thirty years. If increasing amounts
of economic activity will be conducted through electronic commerce
by remote vendors, the question naturally arises as to which states, if
any, would or should have jurisdiction to require collection of sales
or use taxes associated with such activity. If states and localities are
unable to collect sales or use taxes with respect to such activity, there
could be substantial revenue implications for particular state and local governments. In addition, if such transactions effectuated
through electronic commerce are not amenable to tax collection for
legal or practical reasons, it raises the question of whether taxing the
12

HEL-FIN

009]

03/29/00 2:05 PM

State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Proposals for Change

sale or use of equivalent products or services in conventional commerce is equitable. The answer to these questions may raise the fundamental issue posed at the outset of this introduction, namely,
whether the existing state and local sales and use tax system is compatible with an electronic commerce environment.
2. Complexity and inconsistency of state and local sales and use tax laws
The complexity within states and the inconsistency among states
in the existing state and local sales tax structure has been a major
concern with respect to the ability of this structure to accommodate
the world of electronic commerce. Although this is not a novel concern to state taxpayers and state tax administrators, it is one that is
exacerbated in the context of electronic commerce because of the
expectation that more vendors will be selling more products (digital
and nondigital) into more states with less contact and less familiarity
with the states and their tax systems than ever before. Consequently,
the need for simplification of the sales and use tax system is apparent
if it is to be a viable and administrable mechanism for raising revenue
in the electronic environment.
The principal sources of complexity that most observers have
identified in the existing sales and use tax structure are tax rates, the
tax base, and tax administration. With respect to rates, the essential
problem is the existence of different rates in different localities within
a state. These differences raise serious compliance concerns. With respect to base, the essential problems are: (1) the lack of consistent
and uniform definitions of goods and services across states, thus
complicating vendor efforts to determine taxable and nontaxable
goods and services; and (2) the lack of one information resource for
what is taxable and not taxable in each state. With respect to tax administration, the concerns relate to multiple and sometimes inconsistent requirements for registration, returns, remittances, exemption
certificates, and audits.
3. Telecommunications tax issues
Because telecommunications currently serves as the “backbone”
of most Internet transactions, and will compete with other technologies (e.g., cable, satellite) in the future to carry Internet traffic, telecommunications taxation has also been a significant concern. Although many of the issues described under the rubric of “electronic
13
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commerce” are equally applicable to telecommunications, state and
local taxation of telecommunications raises a number of special concerns. These include the following issues: (1) whether state and local
transaction taxes imposed on telecommunications providers and their
customers should be applied uniformly, without regard to the regulatory status of the entity providing the service; (2) whether it is possible to arrive at a uniform definition of “telecommunications”; (3)
whether the tax system should provide a mechanism for “unbundling” telecommunications from other services for tax purposes; and
(4) whether administrative burdens on telecommunications taxation
can be minimized, consistent with the legitimate concerns of local
governments for revenue, by imposing a single state-wide transaction
tax in lieu of various state and local telecommunications taxes.
B. The Role of Tax Policy in Crafting Substantive and Procedural
Rules
In the context of these issues and concerns, the challenge is to
devise electronic commerce tax policies that embody the important
principles which guide all good tax policy, and that would be administrable in light of the new modes of conducting interstate commerce. The principle of economic neutrality (i.e., the system should
not influence the choices made by commercial actors regarding how
business is conducted) is perhaps the most commonly cited tax policy criterion that drives the electronic commerce tax debate. Other
principles that have been cited in this context include uniformity in
taxation, transparency of the tax structure, full taxation of commerce,
avoidance of multiple or “discriminatory” (i.e., targeted) taxation of
commerce, and functional equivalence (i.e., treating functionally
equivalent transactions similarly for tax purposes, so as to ensure a
“level playing field”). In addition to these traditional tax policy criteria, a critical consideration in the redesign of electronic commerce
tax policy for government participants is the concept of “revenue
neutrality,” or the goal of having the cumulative changes to the existing tax structure avoid any potential revenue drain associated with
the non-taxation or limited taxation of electronic commerce.9
9. Conversely, revenue neutrality should also protect electronic commerce from bearing heavier tax burdens, at the end of the day, than are imposed under the current state and
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Of course, it has been well recognized that these principles may
conflict with one another and that one principle may serve as the underpinning for several tax schemes, each of which is inconsistent with
the others, for example, with respect to the placement of tax burdens
or the design of nexus standards.10 A scheme that creates a level
playing field may impose insuperable administrative costs, yet a tailored nexus rule designed to create administrative ease for electronic
commerce transactions violates level playing field considerations. Indeed, it is the effort to reconcile these competing principles, which
command virtually uniform support when viewed alone but often irreconcilable conflicts when considered together, that provides the
focus for much of the debate over whether and how to tax electronic
commerce. We now examine this debate in more detail within the
context of the NTA Project11 and the proceedings before the
ACEC.12
II. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY
STATE TAXATION OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
A. The National Tax Association’s Communications and Electronic
Commerce Tax Project
It was in the context of the questions and issues discussed
above13 that the National Tax Association (“NTA”) formally convened the NTA Project in early 1997. The NTA is an association
with a long and distinguished history as a forum for the discussion
and evaluation of tax policy with a broad-based membership from
business, government, and academia.14
local tax regime. See, e.g., William J. McArthur, Jr. & Peter R. Merrill, A Modest Principle: No
Net Net Tax (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org> (proposal presented to Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce).
10. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Achieving a Level Playing Field for Electronic Commerce,
14 ST. TAX NOTES 1767 (1998).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See supra Part I.
14. The following description of the NTA is located at the NTA’s Website.
The [NTA] is a nonpartisan, nonpolitical educational association that fosters
study and discussion of complex and controversial issues in tax theory, practice
and policy, and other aspects of public finance. NTA is a 501(c)(3) organization and does not promote any particular tax program or policy. The enormous
public benefit that can come from sound tax policy and wise administration is a
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In November 1996, the NTA cosponsored a Conference on
Taxation of Telecommunications and Electronic Commerce in Boston.15 The Boston conference was the first of its kind to focus on the
host of issues raised by taxation of telecommunications and electronic commerce at the federal, state, and local levels. The conference included wide-ranging discussions from markedly different
viewpoints of the impact of changes in telecommunications law and
technology and, in particular, the development of the Internet, on
the federal income tax, state corporate income and sales taxes, and
local property taxes and franchise fees.
Despite the significant differences of opinion on many of the
critical issues that were voiced at the Boston conference, two themes
emerged during the course of the presentations and discussions.
First, many of the conference participants appeared to share the view
that taxation of telecommunications and electronic commerce, particularly at the state and local levels, raised a series of significant
problems that required a uniform, equitable, and administrable solution on a nationwide basis. Second, many of the conference participants likewise appeared to share the view that such a solution could
be achieved if representatives of business and government collaborated with one another to resolve these issues. Indeed, the suggestion was made at the close of the Boston conference that an effort be
undertaken, with the cooperation of interested parties and academics, to forge a solution to the problems raised by state taxation of
telecommunications and electronic commerce through the drafting
of a uniform state statute.16
The NTA Project brought together representatives of the business community, state and local governments, and academia who
shared an interest in identifying possible solutions to the state and
local tax issues raised by electronic commerce. The purpose of the
prime reason for the work of NTA.
About NTA (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://ntanet.org/>.
15. The following discussion again draws directly from the NTA Final Report, supra
note 7.
16. With the benefit of hindsight, this suggestion appears, at a minimum, to have been
premature, based on the sheer number and complexity of issues—of a legal, policy, and procedural nature—that electronic commerce and telecommunications taxation pose. It nonetheless
served as the fulcrum for the NTA’s decision to convene a “neutral forum” for purposes of the
NTA Project initiative.
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Project was “to develop a broadly available public report which
identifies and explores the issues involved in applying state and local
taxes and fees to electronic commerce and which makes recommendations to state and local officials regarding the application of such
taxes.”17
In order to assess fairly the caliber and import of the Project’s
work product, we believe that it is necessary first to consider the
Project’s organization and operations, as well as its intersection with
contemporaneous federal legislative efforts to address the perceived
electronic commerce state and local tax “problem.” We then explore
each discrete set of issues that the Project undertook to examine and,
to a greater or lesser extent, redesign in the context of the Project’s
Final Report (“Report”).
1. NTA Project organization, membership, deliberations, and voting
The NTA Project was designed as an “open” process, in that
“[a]ny person, business, corporation, public agency or organization
with an interest in state and local taxation of electronic commerce
and that wishes to become a member of the . . . Project”18 could become one and officially participate. Participants believed that the
success of the Project—which was essentially an unprecedented effort
to formulate tax policies at the state and local level19—would depend
on the maintenance of openness and balance in the process. In
keeping with this policy, all meetings of the Project’s Steering
Committee were open to the public and to the press.
17. NTA, Description of the Organization and Operations of the Communications and
Electronic Commerce Tax Project (visited Mar. 11, 2000) <http://ntanet.org/> (accessible
from the NTA homepage by clicking on E-Commerce and Tax Policy : Official Documents :
OD-1).
18. Id.
19. While certain government and taxpayer representative organizations had previously
attempted to form consensus-based or negotiated approaches to particular, discrete issues of
state taxation, the Project represents the most ambitious cooperative effort to date in this
arena. Many Project participants had also been active in such prior efforts by the Multistate Tax
Commission (“MTC”) and the Financial Institutions State Tax Coalition to draft industryspecific apportionment regulations for financial institutions; the multi-organizational initiative
(MTC, Federation of Tax Administrators, Committee On State Taxation, Institute of Professionals in Taxation, and Tax Executives Institute) to draft uniform regulations governing certain electronic business processes that impact sales/use tax administration; the MTC Public
Participation Working Groups on the sales/use tax nexus standard and the definition of “business income” for income tax purposes; and the Direct Marketing Association’s attempt to negotiate with states a voluntary use tax collection agreement.
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This Steering Committee was formed by the initial participants
to exercise oversight of the process; it worked to ensure that all Project members had an opportunity to review the various proposals and
served as a forum for discussing tax policy issues and organizing the
input of Project members into Project recommendations. Sixteen
business representatives, sixteen government representatives, and
seven “other” representatives were appointed to sit on the Steering
Committee; this designation entailed a commitment to remain active
in the process and to attend all the meetings, which were held approximately four times a year.20
The NTA Board appointed two cochairs21 to lead the Project and
provide liaison with the Board and general members of the NTA. In
addition to the Steering Committee, the Project established several
other committees and working groups. An Operating Committee assisted with the mechanics of running a voluntary collaborative process; it was comprised of the two Project cochairs and three business
and three government representatives from among the Steering
Committee members.22 Early in the process, a Drafting Committee
was convened to assist with efforts to draft proposals and to encompass any consensus reached by the Steering Committee; membership
on this committee evolved over time but was limited to ensure that it
could effectively draft working documents for consideration by the
entire Steering Committee. Working groups were also assigned to
address specific issues that became important components of the
Project.
Because the output of the Project was dependent upon the for20. See NTA, Final Report, supra note 7 (listing Steering Committee members). Business representatives were organizations (e.g., Committee on State Taxation, National Cable
Television Association, and Information Technology Association of America, among others).
Government representatives included one or two individuals affiliated with specific organizations (e.g., National Governors Association, National League of Cities, and National Conference of State Legislatures). “Others” included the American Bar Association, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a U.S. Treasury representative, and three academicians (Professor Walter Hellerstein of the University of Georgia Law School; Dr. Charles E.
McLure, Jr., of the Hoover Institution; and Professor Robert P. Strauss of the CarnegieMellon University); the seventh “other” slot was never filled.
21. Professor Gary C. Cornia, Brigham Young University (Marriott School of Business)
and Kendall L. Houghton, a partner in Alston & Bird LLP.
22. The Steering Committee met nine times between September 1997 and July 1999.
In addition, the Operating Committee met separately four times during this period.
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mation of “consensus” among the Steering Committee members, an
attempt was made to prevent “winners” and “losers” in the grand
sense. Consensus, as envisioned by Project participants, implied a
generally high level of agreement within the relevant parties, so that
no significant faction of the group felt compelled to leave the process
and attempt to undermine the result. Of course, requiring consensus
also implied that there would not be agreement on some issues and
that unanimity was not likely in most instances. Ultimately, “consensus” was translated by the Project bylaws into specific voting requirements to eliminate subjective disagreements over whether or
when consensus had been obtained. Voting was to be conducted on
any motion introduced by a Steering Committee member, based on
a roll call and conducted pursuant to parliamentary procedure. A
seventy-five percent vote of those Steering Committee members present (in person or by proxy) was required to approve any motion,
with at least six government members and six business members included in the supermajority.23
It is clear that the Project’s structure and set of procedures
helped manage the complexities and the vast array of issues that
arose when discussing state and local taxation of electronic commerce. While the process was expansive in scope, the Steering Committee broke down the issues to be voted on relatively early in the
process, so that working groups could fully examine and present a
diversity of viewpoints and potential resolutions to narrowly framed
questions. Each issue or question was presented by the relevant
working group for a separate vote, and the Report notes the outcome of these individual motions and votes, with the critical caveat
that “nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to” (i.e., no one
vote has significance or effect independent of the other issues being
considered and voted on by the Project members).
2. NTA Project as companion and counterpart to the Internet Tax
Freedom Act
On March 13, 1997, shortly after the NTA Project was launched
but before it commenced official Steering Committee meetings,
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Representative Chris Cox (R-CA)
23. NTA, Bylaws of the NTA Steering Committee, § 2.03 (visited Mar. 11, 2000)
<http://ntanet.org/> (accessible from the NTA homepage by clicking on E-Commerce and
Tax Policy : Official Documents : OD-14).
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introduced the Internet Tax Freedom Act legislation.24 The stated
goal of the legislation was
[t]o amend the Communications Act of 1934 to establish a national policy against State and local interference with interstate
commerce on the Internet or interactive computer services, and to
exercise congressional jurisdiction over interstate commerce by establishing a moratorium on the imposition of exactions that would
interfere with the free flow of commerce via the Internet, and for
other purposes.25

The introduction of the Internet Tax Freedom Act (“ITFA”)
clearly signaled that its “sponsors and many others in Congress
viewed subfederal taxation of electronic commerce (i.e., Internet access, online services, and commerce conducted via these channels) as
unwieldy, completely non-uniform and a potential threat to the development and success of new technologies on both an interstate and
international basis.”26 Therefore, the ITFA focused primarily on
placing a moratorium on state and local taxation of enumerated
forms of electronic commerce, with a secondary focus on ways for
Congress to “facilitate” (or preempt, depending upon one’s viewpoint) the process of developing workable tax policy that would be
implemented on an essentially uniform basis by state and local governments.
On the one hand, the philosophy informing the congressional
legislative initiative was rooted in the federal government’s power to
restrain, under Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause, the power of state and local governments to tax electronic commerce. Of course, what’s good for the
goose can also be good for the gander. Once it became apparent to
state and local governments that the ITFA was seriously “in play,”
then several state and local governmental organizations recognized
the opportunity to petition for adjustments in the status quo of state
taxation of interstate commerce. These adjustments would employ

24. H.R. 1054 and S. 442, 105th Cong. (1997).
25. Id., at 1.
26. Kendall L. Houghton, The Federal Legislative and NTA Tax Project Initiatives on
Electronic Commerce Taxation, J. MULTIST. TAX’N AND INCENTIVES, Sept./Oct. 1998, at
148-54. The following discussion draws from this article.
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Congress’s plenary power over interstate commerce to reduce existing taxpayer protections under the negative commerce clause
through the ITFA legislation.
On the other hand, the philosophy informing the Project efforts
was, by and large, one of pragmatism combined with a desire to develop objectively “good” tax rules for electronic commerce. The
Project participants were careful to acknowledge at the outset that
the concerns of government were equally valid and deserving of examination as the concerns of taxpayers, so that the product of the
initiative would be viewed as essentially neutral (a critical selling
point since adoption of the Project’s recommendations presumably
would be voluntary).27 In addition, the Project was serving as a negotiating table for the participants, where changes or concessions
would be required of both sides in the pursuit of more workable and
efficient rules and procedures for electronic commerce. Successful
collaboration, it was projected, would result in greater ease of tax
administration and taxpayer compliance in the context of both electronic and traditional commerce.
From the standpoint of process and dynamics, as well as the likelihood of success, the intersection of these two initiatives is also intriguing. The number and complexity of the steps required to enact
a federal bill and submit it for signature by the President of the
United States are so numerous that the potential for successful congressional action (even discounting the political obstacles) is always
in doubt. In order to enact the ITFA, an elaborate chain of events,
including the following, occurred: (1) identification of willing and
“appropriate” cosponsors of a House and Senate bill addressing state
taxation of electronic commerce (in light of the sponsors’ membership on key committees, status in their party, and in their congressional chamber); (2) identification and coordination of the goals of
the prospective legislation, which entailed numerous consultations
between the sponsors and business groups and consumers across the
country; (3) technical education of the Congressmen’s staff members
who were responsible for drafting and moving the bills; (4) drafting
the ITFA provisions (which resulted in the introduction of identical
House and Senate versions, although amendments to each swiftly
27. The question of how to implement any recommendations of the Project was the
focus of one working group. That group considered a number of alternatives, including federal
legislative mandates to adopt Project recommendations. However, the Project was unable to
assume that any option besides state-by-state adoption of its proposals would be practicable.
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eroded parity between the bills); (5) referral of the bills to the appropriate committees (in the Senate, the ITFA was referred to the
Commerce and Finance Committees, and in the House, to the
Commerce and Judiciary Committees); (6) solicitation of cosponsors
in each chamber; (7) consideration of the bills and receipt of commentary and suggested changes by the sponsors and committee staffs
(i.e., full-court lobbying by interested parties, including government,
business and consumer representatives); (8) conduct of committee
hearings; (9) multiple introductions of amendments, substitute bills,
and alternative bills on the same topic; (10) committee mark-up sessions on the various bills; and (11) upon committee approval, introduction of the amended bills for a “floor vote” by the full chamber.
Any number of these steps was repeated with respect to new versions
of the legislation.
The original ITFA legislation imposed a six-year moratorium on
the imposition, assessment, or attempt to collect any tax on the
Internet or online services (including access to or use of communications and transactions that occur through the Internet or online
services) by states or political subdivisions thereof. The moratorium
was subject to three major exceptions relating to net income taxes,
business license taxes, and certain evenly applied sales and use taxes.
After the bill’s introduction before the Commerce Committees
of both houses of Congress and the Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives, these committees held three hearings in
1997, and the cosponsors agreed to certain revisions in an attempt to
reduce the level of concern with the moratorium expressed by state
and local governmental interests. The early versions of the Act called
for a “Consultative Group” of federal, state, and local government
officials, businesses, representative organizations, and other informed
and interested parties to meet for two years subsequent to enactment
in order to consider domestic and international taxation of electronic
commerce, to explore avenues of resolution, and to provide the
President with policy recommendations.
On May 14, 1998, the House Commerce Committee held a
hearing and unanimously approved H.R. 3849, a new and significantly revised version of the ITFA. This new bill reflected a compromise negotiated by Representative Cox and the National Governors Association earlier in the spring. Unlike the original approach,
22
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which placed a moratorium on all taxes on the Internet and online
services with certain enumerated state and local tax preservation
clauses, the new approach called for a three-year moratorium on
certain specified taxes and otherwise permitted all state and local
taxation of electronic commerce. The Act specifically prohibited
(during the moratorium period) (i) taxes on Internet access or online
services,28 (ii) bit taxes, and (iii) multiple or discriminatory taxes on
electronic commerce.29
H.R. 3849 replaced the Consultative Group with a federally appointed ACEC that was to consist of twenty-nine members (fourteen
representatives from state, local, and county government organizations; thirteen representatives from taxpayer, consumer, and business
interests; and the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury (or their
designates)).30
The less active Senate finally followed the lead of the House
when it passed its own version of the ITFA on October 8, 1998, by a
96-2 vote. As a result of intensive end-of-session lobbying and
conferencing activity, Congress enacted the final version of ITFA
(H.R. 4328), which was incorporated into the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1998.31 The ITFA instituted a moratorium for
the three-year period beginning October 1, 1998, on (1) state and
local taxation of Internet access charges—subject to a grandfather
provision for such taxes if generally imposed and actually enforced
28. A grandfather clause permitted state taxes on Internet access or online services
“generally imposed and actually enforced” prior to March 1, 1998. However, to activate the
clause, states with such taxes in force must have enacted a law that expressly imposes such taxes
within one year of the Act’s enactment.
29. A later-amended substitute House bill, H.R. 4105, was introduced and passed the
House by voice vote on June 23, 1998. The bill was similar to H.R. 3849, but there were
three notable differences: (1) it added two individuals to the Commission (another business
representative plus the Attorney General or their designate); (2) it specifically identified all existing state taxes on Internet access that may be subject to “grandfathering” under the moratorium provision; and (3) it indicated that the Advisory Commission “may,” not “shall,” address
the enumerated agenda items set forth in the bill in drafting its model legislation.
30. The final version of the ITFA (H.R. 4328) changed this provision so that the ACEC
membership consisted of eight business representatives, eight state and local government representatives, three federal government representatives (for the Secretaries of Commerce and the
Treasury and the U.S. Trade Representative). The commissioners were authorized to select the
ACEC chair, and the House and Senate majority and minority leadership divided appointments
to the ACEC.
31. The ITFA in its enacted form also incorporates provisions relating to protection of
minors from inappropriate materials on the Internet. While the merging of tax and censorship
provisions is somewhat awkward, the basic thrust of the ITFA remains the same.
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prior to October 1, 1998—and (2) “multiple taxes” or “discriminatory taxes” on electronic commerce.32 The ITFA states that it is not
to impact state and local taxation in any other capacity, nor affect liability for ongoing litigation relating to taxes accrued prior to enactment.33 The ITFA charged the ACEC (in slightly restructured
form) with producing a study and corresponding legislative recommendations, as discussed below.34
When contrasted with the legislative process described above, the
dynamics of the NTA Project tended to be quite different. First, the
operational features of the Project developed as the initiative proceeded and were adjusted to some extent over time as the needs of
the group changed. Second, the lobbying conducted in the NTA
Project context had to be directed to one’s business or government
counterparts, not to an independent third party. Therefore, the interactions were more direct and undiluted. Third, the tone was arguably less emotional, except when the Project addressed the “core
issues” for an interest group (e.g., loss of state sovereignty or local
autonomy for the government representatives or reduction of dormant Commerce Clause nexus protections for remote sellers for
business representatives).
Furthermore, the Project participants generally exhibited a more
patient and cautious approach toward even the emotional or otherwise difficult issues than did participants in the advocacy-driven federal legislative process. This may be explained by the fact that the
Project’s success depended upon everyone staying in the room together to achieve the necessary “consensus” that was essential to the
Project’s output. Because there would be no output without “consensus,” and because most of the participants felt that the output of
the process was critical to them, they continued to communicate and
deliberate to achieve a goal that could not be obtained in the absence of such communication and deliberation. By contrast, while
the federal legislative process is supposed to yield an outcome that is
roughly fair to all sides, or at least representative of a melding of
32. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1101-04, 112 Stat. 2681-719
(1998) [hereinafter ITFA]. For a detailed analysis of the substantive provisions of ITFA, see
Hellerstein, Internet Tax, supra note 1.
33. ITFA §§ 1101(b)-(c).
34. See infra Part II.B.
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viewpoints, there can clearly be “winners” and “losers” in the legislative process, depending upon how well the interested parties have
allocated resources, crafted alliances, and promoted their agendas.
Interestingly, the ITFA provides that “[t]he [ACEC] shall, to
the extent possible, ensure that its work does not undermine the efforts of the National Tax Association Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project.”35 Both initiatives were conducted
with complete awareness of the other, and this directive seems to
suggest that Congress valued the projected output of the Project. In
fact, participants in the Project lobbied Congress to include the Project, or representatives thereof, in the ACEC structure or, at least, to
require the ACEC to take any Project recommendations into account in forming its own recommendations. Nevertheless, the fact
that the Project discussions were being conducted largely by tax
technicians, as opposed to high-level corporate and government representatives, may have concerned the ITFA sponsors and supporters,
who took a more expansive view of the stakes in this debate—including the national economic importance of new technology-driven
industries and the international competitiveness of U.S. business and
technologies. Hence, the ACEC was free to consult with the Project,
to review Project output, or to ignore the Project, so long as the
Project was not intentionally undermined by the ACEC’s own work
in exploring taxation of electronic commerce. The work of the NTA
Project continued apace during the incubation period of the ITFA,
but the question remained whether the NTA output would be a
companion to, or incorporated into, the output of the federally appointed ACEC.
3. The NTA Report
The NTA Report examined seven major areas of inquiry, describing the various perspectives on how the issues might be resolved
and taking note of any Project consensus or recommendations regarding particular issues.36 At the outset, however, the Project members felt that the NTA Report must clarify the context in which Project members considered all of the issues, and in which the Project
reached any consensus or recommendation. The “Prefatory Caveat”
35. ITFA § 1102(h).
36. The following discussion draws freely from Kendall L. Houghton & Gary C. Cornia,
NAT’L TAX J. (forthcoming 2000).
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to the NTA Report therefore states:
One working assumption underlay all the work of the project, to
wit: “Nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.” Consequently, the Steering Committee wishes to emphasize at the outset
that it would seriously misrepresent the work of the Project to
pluck any of its tentative and preliminary conclusions, including
specifically those it reached by a formal vote, out of context and to
represent them as the conclusion of the Project.37

Nevertheless, for purposes of this article, we examine each section of the Report independently, because it enables us to describe
the framework in which each of the major inquiries was undertaken
and to discuss important features of the Project’s deliberations that
were not reflected in the Project Report. In many instances, this
“editorial” commentary will shed light on the motivations or goals of
the proponents of proposals that have since been submitted to the
ACEC38 and of current federal legislative initiatives relating to taxation of electronic commerce.
a. Sales and use tax rates. The myriad existing state and local sales
tax rates (based on the Report’s estimated 7,600 jurisdictions across
the country that impose a local sales and use tax) imposes a compliance burden on multistate sellers. This problem has the potential to
become even more serious as numerous small sellers enter the market
for the first time. The problem centers on identifying the appropriate
tax rate to charge, which in turn requires identification of the destination jurisdiction. Most solutions to this problem require the purchase and maintenance of software that can track all transactions for
sales tax collection. There is also a concern that it may be difficult to
keep the system current as additional jurisdictions adopt local option
rates and existing rates are changed.
Virtually every member of the Project agreed that the current
rate structure is complicated and potentially very costly for nontraditional marketing firms. These same individuals also recognized the
importance of revenue to local governments and the role sales tax
revenue plays in funding basic government services like public safety

37. NTA Final Report, supra note 7, at 10.
38. See infra Part II.B.
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and general government operation.39 There was also a realization
that the local option sales tax has gradually been replacing the less
popular property tax as a major source of local funding. Thus, no
movement to constrain the use of local option sales taxes could be
undertaken unless the states were willing to hold local governments
harmless. Nevertheless, the Project did adopt as a consensus position
that there should be one sales tax rate in each state that has adopted
the sales tax and granted the use of local option taxes for substatelevel governments. The “one rate per state” recommendation was
tempered by the additional recommendation that states devise methods to protect and continue the equitable distribution of revenues to
local jurisdictions
In addition to “one rate per state,” the Project considered other
solutions to the problem of multiple rates. These alternatives focused
on simplifying the current rate system without adopting a single rate
in each state. Alternatives included conforming tax jurisdiction
boundaries to zip code or zip-plus-4 boundaries, using a Geographic
Information System (GIS) to identify the locale of consumers, and
adopting a two-rate structure with one rate for over-the-counter
transactions and one for remote transactions.
The Project also explored related issues such as how a single rate
per state would be established (i.e., at the current highest or lowest
combined state and local rate, at an average rate, or otherwise) and
what effect this measure would have on revenue neutrality, equity
among communities that currently levy different substate rates, and
potential revenue windfalls or shortfalls. Project members also expressed concern over the frequency of rate changes and the provision
of adequate notice of such changes.
While the Report did not articulate the point, it was clear that
most government representatives viewed their approval of the “one
rate per state” motion as linked to the adoption of means to protect
state and local governments against fiscal losses resulting from the
migration of commerce to the Internet. Indeed, the topic of “duty
to collect” sales and use taxes and the expansion of vendors’ obligations beyond those required by existing constitutional principles was
the very next agenda item that government participants wished to
address, effectively as a quid pro quo for this consensus. The fact that

39. Local sales taxes are also used in some states to fund education and mass transit and
to guarantee bond-issue debt.
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business participants refused to premise an expanded duty to collect
such taxes upon the “one rate per state” recommendation, without
significant additional simplification measures—and possibly not even
in exchange for that package of government concessions—caused a
great deal of tension over the meaning of the vote on the rate issue.
As a result of this controversy, the Steering Committee agreed to examine each set of issues in turn, without engaging in binding action
on any particular issue, and it also developed the mantra that is incorporated into the Report’s Prefatory Caveat: “nothing is agreed to
until everything is agreed to.”
b. Duty to collect sales and use taxes and other jurisdiction-to-tax
issues. The relatively limited attention devoted to questions bearing
on the duty to collect sales and use taxes and analogous jurisdictionto-tax issues presents a misleading picture of the relative importance
of the issue to the NTA Project’s discussions. The issue of tax jurisdiction—“nexus”—has long been the focus of heated controversy in
the state and local tax arena for all types of remote commerce and all
types of taxes. Long-standing tensions, resentments, and mistrusts
probably presaged the lack of consensus on these issues, and familiarity with that background is essential to a full understanding of the
summary treatment of the issue in the NTA Project Report.
Some government representatives have argued that the physicalpresence requirement for Commerce Clause “substantial nexus,” as
enunciated in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,40 is not applicable to
taxes other than sales and use taxes. These advocates rely on language in Quill suggesting that the bright-line test had a historical
application in the context of sales and use taxes (i.e., the Court had
articulated the physical-presence standard in an earlier use tax case,
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue41) but did not
control other types of tax cases.42 Taxpayers have responded to this
argument by noting that the Court stated clearly in Quill that:

40. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
41. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
42. Moreover, it has been argued that in the current environment, where businesses exploit multistate markets on a regular basis and multistate sellers have access to commercially
available tax collection software, lowering the nexus threshold for either sales and use taxes or
direct business taxes would not upset “settled expectations,” nor would this action constitute
an “undue burden on interstate commerce” so as to violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
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[A]lthough our Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors more
flexible balancing analyses, we have never intimated a desire to reject all established “bright-line” tests. Although we have not, in our
review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physicalpresence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use
taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess
rules.43

While the Supreme Court has yet to address this question, various states have attempted to resolve the ongoing nexus controversy
in their own courts, both by reference to constitutional jurisprudence
and their own statutory schemes.44 In addition, attempts have been
made by state governmental representatives, working with Congress,
to enact “corrective” federal legislation designed to require remote
sellers to collect sales and use taxes on interstate transactions, assuming at least a de minimis level of sales, either nationally or on an
in-state basis.45 Business representatives, however, have regularly and
vehemently opposed state-supported efforts to have Congress affirmatively reset the judicially-established Commerce Clause sales and
use tax nexus bar at a lower level—as the Supreme Court in Quill
explicitly invited Congress to do if Congress did not agree with the
Court’s creation of a bright-line physical-presence standard of “substantial nexus” for use tax collection purposes under the dormant
Commerce Clause.
Moreover, organizations such as the Direct Marketing Association, the Federation of Tax Administrators, and the Multistate Tax
Commission have undertaken a series of efforts—to date unsuccess-

43. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314. In this vein, “the Court also noted expressly that all of its
prior decisions upholding taxes against Commerce Clause challenges, including the modern
cases on which North Dakota placed reliance, involved taxpayers who, in fact, did have a physical presence in the taxing state.” John L. Coalson, Jr. & Fred O. Marcus, What Is ‘Substantial
Nexus’ After Quill? 2 ST. & LOC. TAX LAW 17, 26 (1997).
44. But cf. J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, No. M1998-00497-COA-R3CV, 1999
WL 1206684 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1999); Crown Cork & Seal (Del.) Inc. v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, No. C-97-0028-01, 1999 Md. Tax LEXIS 4 (Apr. 26, 1999); MCI Int’l Telecomm. Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-96-0028-01, 1999 Md. Tax LEXIS 5
(Apr. 26, 1999); SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-96-0154-01, 1999 Md. Tax
LEXIS 3 (Apr. 26, 1999); Cerro Copper Prod., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, No. F-94444, 1995 Ala. Tax LEXIS 21, at *6-14 (Ala. Dept. Rev. Dec. 11, 1995); Geoffrey, Inc. v.
South Carolina State Tax Comm’n., 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
45. See, e.g., The Consumer and Main Street Protection Act of 1997, S. 1586, 105th
Cong. (1997); The Consumer and Main Street Protection Act of 1995, S. 545, 104th Cong.
(1995).
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ful—to negotiate a voluntary agreement between remote sellers and
states, whereby the seller would agree to collect use taxes in exchange for certain concessions regarding the voluntary tax remitter’s
administrative compliance burdens.46 However, none of these initiatives—judicial, legislative, or negotiated—has defused the controversy between states and taxpayers over appropriate nexus standards,
and the stakes are viewed as particularly high by both sides.
Against this background, the Project’s general discussions focused on the extent of a seller’s obligation to collect sales and use
taxes and the appropriate definition of “nexus” for purposes of electronic commerce. The Project members explored three alternative
proposals during these discussions. The first was to replace the current nexus standard with a collection duty premised upon a vendor’s
national or individual single state sales volume. Advocates of this approach cited the following benefits: (1) establishing a “true” objective “bright line” test (i.e., no subjective examination of de minimis
physical contacts but rather review only the dollar level of sales); (2)
substantially eliminating or reducing nexus disputes; (3) recognizing
the contributions of state and local governments to supporting
commerce; and (4) fostering a level playing field among vendors
selling into the same marketplace.
The second suggestion was to maintain the current nexus standard established in such cases as Quill 47 and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.48 Advocates of this approach cited the

46. During 1997-98, the Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”) attempted to negotiate a Limited Contacts Taxpayer Agreement with certain states’ administrations and with the
informal technical advice of the Federation of Tax Administrators and Multistate Tax Commission. This agreement was designed to address the long-standing tug-of-war between states that
are not collecting use taxes from their own residents and mail-order sellers who have successfully argued that they lack nexus for purposes of collecting these same use taxes on sales they
make into states where they are not physically present.
The DMA indicated that if states and localities offered mail-order sellers the right incentives—in the form of simplified collection and reporting obligations and a safe harbor for substantial compliance with state and local use tax laws—then those sellers would in large part
voluntarily come forward and register to collect taxes, thus making nexus a moot point. This
draft agreement was intended to embody the terms on which voluntary collection would ensue. However, the effort was unsuccessful due in part to unfavorable media coverage and resultant negative consumer reactions.
47. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
48. 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
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following benefits: (1) protecting interstate vendors from the patchwork of burdensome and inconsistent state and local tax obligations
as contemplated by existing case law; (2) insulating remote vendors
from tax collection duties in jurisdictions where they effectively received no direct governmental services or benefits; and (3) maintaining an appropriate reliance upon well-established Supreme Court
precedents.
The third suggestion was to clarify further the physical presence
(in both qualitative and quantitative terms) that is necessary to establish a vendor’s duty to collect the sales or use tax. Advocates of
this approach cited its benefit of reinforcing existing Supreme Court
precedent while further reducing the possibility for nexus disputes
that might arise from unclear or inconsistent interpretations by the
states of existing nexus standards. In fact, proponents of this approach offered up a list of physical contacts and activities within a
state, by or on behalf of a vendor, that should be subject to a nexus
“safe harbor” akin to that created by Public Law 86-272 for net income tax purposes. Proponents of these proposed safe harbor contacts noted that many of them constituted contacts by the vendor-asconsumer, rather than as seller, of goods and services within the
subject state—in which case, they argued, the contacts benefited the
state but did not constitute sales or use tax nexus contacts of the sort
that “establish and maintain a market in [the] state.”49
While all Project participants clearly understood the relevance
and ramifications of considering an expanded duty to collect sales
and use taxes, the discussions did not reach a consensus as to the appropriate outcome. Some of the business representatives did not feel
inclined to make any concessions on their current constitutional
protection unless and until simplification procedures that substantially eased their compliance burden were already in place.
Even more critical to the log-jam, however, was their conviction
that any change in the nexus standards for sales and use taxes would
necessarily have nexus implications for other types of direct business
taxes (e.g., net or gross income taxes, franchise taxes, and other taxes
borne directly by the business entity). This concern was among the
most contentious of all the issues reviewed during the Project. Government officials conceded that expanded sales and use tax nexus

49. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250
(1987).
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could be viewed as a precursor to alteration in the current (precarious) balance for other types of taxes.50 However, they professed to
believe that a series of safeguards could be adopted to prevent this
spillover effect. One suggestion was implementing a rule that registration for sales or use tax purposes could not be construed by the
state as establishing nexus for other taxes. Attempts to find an acceptable solution to this concern were not successful.
The business group as a whole eventually espoused the position
that a physical presence test should become the accepted nexus standard for all types of taxes, but at the very least for sales and use taxes.
Other participants in the Project, primarily the government and academic members, rejected the status quo as an acceptable approach to
electronic commerce and urged the adoption of a nexus test based
on economic activity (e.g., a sales threshold) with the development
of safeguards or an articulation of a “firewall” for purposes of distinguishing nexus standards for direct business taxes. Not surprisingly,
the Project participants could not resolve this issue in a manner that
satisfied the consensus requirement of the Project.
c. Sales and use tax base. The diversity of state and local tax bases
creates significant complexity for sellers doing business in multiple
states and attempting to comply with sales and use tax requirements.
Exemptions vary between states and within some states and may be
based on the specific good or service, the manner of use of the good
or service, the status of the purchaser of the good or service, and
whether the good or service is being purchased for resale. There was
general agreement among the Project participants that the current
system was difficult to track for multistate sellers. One obvious solution to such a situation would be the development of a uniform
standard for the taxation and exemption of goods and services.
However, the Project members unanimously rejected this approach,
50. In fact, many states have contended in income and franchise tax nexus litigation that
the nexus standard for these taxes is, at worst, no more stringent than in the sales and use tax
context pursuant to dicta contained in Quill and, at best, is not premised upon the entity’s
physical presence within a state at all, but rather, its mere economic presence. See Geoffrey,
Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993). Therefore, they have reasoned, any downward adjustment to the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard that Quill
enunciates—whether through voluntary expansion of the duty to collect (i.e., a waiver of constitutionally available protections) or through congressional action to adjust the nexus standard—would have a corresponding impact on nexus for other types of taxes.
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because they recognized the importance of reinforcing state sovereignty in regard to determinations of what would or would not be
included in their sales and use tax bases.51
The Project instead adopted an approach that explored the development and implementation of uniform definitions or classifications of products and services for tax base purposes. Under this system, states would continue to determine the taxable status of
products and services, but the definition of each enumerated good
and service would be consistent between and among the states. The
Project determined that such a tax base “menu” would need to
contain sufficient detail to enable it to be capable of corresponding,
to a great degree, to the states’ current tax bases. This approach
would simplify the transition to a new articulation of each state’s tax
base, as well as the development of software that would enable sellers
to determine whether their product or service was taxable in each
customer’s state.
The Project identified and evaluated potential sources for uniform definitions of product and services. It considered four different
classifications: North American Industrial Code System, United
States Harmonized Tariff Schedule, Bureau of Labor Statistics Expense Categories, and United Nations Centralized Product Classification (“CPC”). Generally, the Project participants felt that the classification system with the highest potential to serve as a starting
point for a uniform state sales and use tax base menu was the CPC
system. The other three classification systems had one or more flaws:
their focus on the production side of the economy in classifying
goods and services, their lack of attention to services (e.g., they only
defined or classified goods), or the fact that they were extremely detailed and would have been precise but too detailed for state usage
(or, at the opposite extreme, lacking sufficient detail to offer much
guidance to state lawmakers).
The Project did not formally recommend the CPC system. However, the Project members encouraged a continued study of the potential use of the CPC and the U.S. Census Bureau’s efforts to create
integrated classification systems for both goods and services based on
51. In this regard, both business and governmental representatives agreed that the ability of states to use tax base determinations to promote specific social and economic policies,
e.g., to create incentives for (or “punish”) certain actors or products, was a key feature of the
division of powers inherent in our federal system of government and an ability that both sides
valued greatly as a means to promote competitiveness of states and of industries.
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the CPC system.52
The Project also considered the treatment of exemptions by
states from sales and use taxes. Exemptions, while an important tool
to effectuate tax policy, create compliance complexity and exposure
to audit risk. The Project explored several options to reduce the
problems associated with nonuniform exemptions. One approach
considered in some detail was the development of model exemptions
relating to business inputs (e.g., sales for resale, purchases that become a component of another product, items used or consumed in
the manufacturing process, and agricultural equipment and supplies)
that would encourage states to standardize their treatment of business purchases.
Finally, the Project reviewed several additional measures that
might reduce the instances of inconsistent treatment of identical tax
base items, including (1) utilizing set rules of interpretation (such as
those devised by the UN for the CPC system); (2) requiring states to
come to agreement among themselves as to which interpretation is
correct, as an initial matter; and (3) as a last resort, establishing a
“competent authority” to rule on inconsistencies. In combination
with a process to ensure that the tax base menu would be “dynamic”
(i.e., able to accommodate the development of, and define, new
goods and/or services), the Project viewed a limitation of the frequency of such change as potentially useful.
d. Sourcing transactions for sales and use tax purposes. The traditional practice of sourcing sales transactions to the taxing jurisdiction
where the product or service is purchased or consumed works well
when buyer and seller are engaged in routine commercial exchanges.
However, destination-based sourcing is more complicated in an era
of electronic commerce because the point of consumption is not always known to the seller (e.g., in sales of digital products or services
delivered via the Internet or other electronic means, or in instances
where buyers of goods or services have multiple users who access
digital products from multistate locations). Within this context, the
52. The Project recognized that the Multistate Tax Commission was undertaking an
initial study of the similarity between the United Nations CPC system and the existing tax
bases of three states to determine the degree of synchronicity between them and the potential
for utilization of the CPC system as the basis for developing a uniform tax base menu for the
states.
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Project entered into a series of discussions regarding the proper
sourcing of sales.
The Project Steering Committee adopted a consensus position
(ratified by a formal vote, subject to the Prefatory Caveat53) that sales
should be sourced to the state level only (not to a substate level) and
that the sourcing should be based on the state of use or destination
of the product or service purchased. The Project also recommended
that uniform procedures be developed to protect out-of-state vendors from audit exposure in situations where, after a good faith effort
on their part, the destination of the product or service could not be
determined.
The Project participants felt that this recommendation would enable transactions to be sourced to the point of destination without
imposing a set of requirements that would be unduly constricting on
sellers in terms of their information gathering or verification duties:
This should increase the proportion of transactions for which the
requisite sourcing information is available in the normal course of
business. It should also reduce potential burdens and complications
for sellers as well as reduce concerns about intrusions into matters
of privacy and personal information, compared to other alternatives. The recommendation helps avoid drawing distinctions between forms of commerce (e.g., electronic vs. mail order) or types
of products (e.g., digital vs. tangible).54

This recommendation nevertheless raised concerns for those
members of the Steering Committee who believed that failure to
source sales to the local taxing jurisdiction would undermine local
fiscal autonomy. In this regard, the Project members again examined
tax rate concepts proposed as an alternative to “one rate per state”—
such as zip codes or the use of two rates (one for “over-the-counter”
and one for interstate or in-state remote sales)—and they again rejected such alternative proposals. Zip codes do not necessarily correlate to local taxing jurisdictions, and a two-rate system would violate
the goal of tax neutrality by treating identical transactions differently
solely by reference to the means by which they were conducted.
Likewise, a two-pronged sourcing approach, whereby digital products are sourced only to the state level but tangible property is sourced to the local level, was rejected as violating the principle of tax
53. See supra text accompanying 37.
54. NTA Final Report, supra note 7, at 32-33.
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neutrality. In response to the concern of local government representatives, the Project recommended that the states devise a fiscal transfer system to protect local governments from potential revenue
losses.
There were also proponents of sourcing Internet sales, if not all
sales, on an origin basis. The argument that an origin-based tax
would be easier to administer for vendors seems apparent (e.g., a
single rate, a single set of exemptions, and a single administrative
system with which to comply for each sales location of the vendor).
Nevertheless, all but a few members of the Project Steering Committee rejected this proposal as completely undermining the conceptual foundation of a retail sales tax operating as a consumption
tax. Virtually everyone connected with the Project found the originbased tax concept objectionable because it would amount to a tax on
production and exports and lead to economic distortions favoring
sellers that located in a state without a sales tax.
Still, the method of sourcing sales where the destination address
is unknown remained unresolved. There was a consensus that sales
should not be exempt from taxation solely because information on
the actual state of destination or use (or the acceptable proxies
therefor, if any) is not known to the seller. In connection with the
Project’s resolution to develop one or more default rules for such
situations, the Project members examined two alternative default
sourcing rules.55 The first was termed the “throw-back” rule; this
rule would source the sales back to the state of origin (i.e., the vendor’s location) in the absence of sales destination information. Considerations of administrative ease support this approach, but it raises
policy problems because states without a sales tax could become tax
havens for online and other remote sellers. The second alternative
was termed the “throw-around” rule. Under this rule, sales without
readily available destination information would be pooled and allocated to states (for purposes of imposing a sales or use tax on the
sales) that impose a sales tax on an agreed-upon allocation formula.
Administratively speaking, this approach creates more difficulties, but
it does not create disincentives with respect to vendor behavior (i.e.,

55. Both alternative default rules were presented to the Project in Report No. 1 of the
Drafting Committee of the NTA Project (1997), reprinted in 13 ST. TAX NOTES 1255 (1997).
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no jurisdiction becomes a “haven” for sales tax purposes). Project
members did not reach an agreement with respect to the advisability
of recommending either of these default rules.
One other concern troubling business representatives in the discussion of developing sourcing rules was their liability for failing to
satisfy state auditors that they had expended sufficient efforts to collect destination data from buyers. In this connection, the Project
members discussed several suggestions for safe harbors that would
protect sellers that were not acting in bad faith56 in securing sourcing
information from the buyer. These safe-harbor proposals included
the following: data provided by the buyer would be assumed to be
correct; decisions on conflicting data would be left with the vendor;
vendors would be required to collect only information from the
buyer that would normally be collected during a transaction; when a
buyer refused to provide sourcing information, the transaction would
be subject to the applicable default sourcing rule; and, when a seller
knows the sourcing data provided by the buyer is false, based on information readily available at the time of the transaction, the sale
would be handled in accordance with a default rule.
e. Simplification of state and local sales tax administration. Nearly
all Project members agreed that the current administrative and compliance system is complex and costly. The burden is most apparent
for multistate vendors who must comply with a multitude of laws
and regulations. It is anticipated that this problem will become more
severe as small vendors increase their marketing via the Internet.
Therefore, the Project concluded that any examination of electronic
commerce sales and use tax issues must deal with this broad set of
issues.
The Project’s discussion of simplification centered on steps to
simplify specific aspects of sales tax administration and to increase
uniformity between the states. While the Project did not adopt a
formal recommendation on simplification, it did consider a series of
specific proposals that could be implemented and would reduce the

56. The Project defined the term “taken in bad faith” as follows:
A seller’s reliance on required sourcing information or resolution of conflicting
sourcing information is “taken in bad faith” (and the seller is outside the safe harbor) if the seller has assisted in securing, or promoted the receipt of, false sourcing
information with the intent that the information if accepted as true will permit the
avoidance of taxes otherwise due.
NTA Final Report, supra note 7, at 47.
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burden of sales and use tax compliance.
The Project members discussed three approaches to simplification. Two of these, denominated Base State Tax Administration and
Real Time Tax Administration, were carefully considered but in the
end were regarded as too complex and uncertain to implement at
this time. The Base State system would require a multistate seller to
deal on most matters of tax administration (e.g., registration, return
filing, tax remittance and audit) with only one state—its base state
(i.e., state of commercial domicile or principal operations). Proponents of this system cite as its advantages a quick and dramatic reduction in administrative burden for interstate sellers and its effective
use in the context of fuel use tax administration (i.e., it is proven).
Opponents of this system, on the other hand, were concerned that
the sales tax system is too complex to have one state administer a
multistate tax regime; that the fuel use tax system is origin-based,
and thus its administration system would not translate well to a destination-based sales tax environment; and that adoption of this system might adversely affect cash flow of some states.
The Real Time Tax Administration system contemplates the use
of electronic technology currently employed to process credit card
purchases to administer the sales and use tax collection and remittance function (including taxability determinations, selection of tax
rates, collection of tax, remittance to appropriate tax jurisdictions,
and appropriate reporting). The system contemplated that the states
would arrange with private sector interests to develop and implement
this system. Proponents of a Real Time Administration system observed that it would relieve vendors of the burden and the corresponding liability for tax collection duties and that state tax administrators would retain control of the technology. Many others,
however, expressed concern that the technology is not available today, that the system’s complexity renders this solution too costly to
develop, that the system would in any event contain numerous flaws,
and that, for these and other reasons, consideration of such a proposal was premature at this time.
The third approach—which the NTA Report states represents
“the most realistic approach to achieving significant simplification in
the near term”—was to improve the current system. Improvements
would be realized through the redesign of various administrative and
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compliance processes. Suggestions for such a redesign included uniform vendor registration (e.g., a national or multistate vendor registration form as an option to existing state-specific forms); uniform
sales and use tax returns (which might reflect streamlined sales tax
rates, sales tax bases, and less frequent filing and tax remittance requirements); electronic filing of returns; uniform state laws on bad
debt deductions (i.e., where a vendor is not fully compensated for a
purchase due to insufficient check funds, terminated installment sales
and other bad debts); increased use of “direct pay” permits (i.e.,
where vendors directly remit use tax on their business purchases of
goods and services); uniform resale exemption certificates and other
exemption administration processes (including establishing a reliance
and indemnification standard for vendors who are provided with
such exemption documentation—although this standard was not
agreed upon); vendor compensation (i.e., relating to the cost of collecting and remitting these taxes, as that cost is reflected in the complexity, or lack thereof, in the system); and simplified audit and appeal procedures (including consideration of so-called Base State and
Customer Tailored Approaches to reducing the number of states that
may audit or review appeals of vendors).
Simplification of the current sales and use tax administration is
critical, regardless of whether consideration is given to extending the
duty to collect tax to certain remote sellers. The work of the Project
indicates there are a number of avenues that can provide meaningful
simplification in pursuit of that goal. Indeed, the proposals that were
subsequently presented to the Federal Advisory Commission on
Electronic Commerce also reflect this viewpoint.57 Of course, successful implementation of these measures will require substantial cooperation among all affected parties.
f. Telecommunications tax issues. Telecommunications tax structures at the state and local level are based on a public utility tax
model designed for the monopoly-based, rate-regulated telephone
system that existed in this country for most of the twentieth century.
Consequently, the tax burdens placed on telecommunications service
providers and consumers have historically been more complex and
more substantial than those placed on providers and consumers of
other types of services. However, the breakup of the Bell System, the
deregulation of the telecommunications industry, and rapid changes
57. See infra Part II.B.2.
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in technology over the past two decades have transformed the telecommunications industry into one of the most competitive sectors of
the economy and rendered the public utility model obsolete. In light
of these developments and, in particular, the fact that different types
of entities are offering substantially identical services, the Steering
Committee members generally agreed that “telecommunications”
should be defined to ensure that competitive neutrality was attained
among competing firms and services without regard to historical industry classifications that may no longer be relevant for tax purposes.
The Project members also asked how state and local jurisdictions
could reform their existing taxes to reduce the tax and compliance
costs faced by some service providers.
The Project’s review covered transaction taxes on telecommunications, but excluded franchise fees—defined as charges by local governments for use of public “rights-of-way.” The Project also deferred
discussion of property taxes, 911 fees, TDD fees, and Universal
Service Fees, in order to narrow the scope of discussions and improve the likelihood of resolving other telecommunications tax issues. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the consensus reached by
the Project members regarding telecommunications taxes was quite
limited. There was general agreement regarding competitive neutrality, as reflected in the following statement:
The premise of telecommunications tax simplification is that telecommunications providers and services should be taxed similarly to
other businesses and services. In light of the changing environment, the existing tax structure originally designed for rateregulated telecommunications companies needs to be reassessed as
it applies to an increasingly competitive industry.58

This statement implicates two forms of competitive neutrality:
(1) neutrality in the taxation of telecommunications services within
the industry and (2) neutrality between the telecommunications industry and “all other commercial businesses.” To the extent that ensuring such neutrality had the effect of subjecting some businesses to
the more onerous telecommunications tax structure, some Project
members preferred to eliminate any special telecommunications taxes
and treat all telecommunications services and service providers under
58. NTA Final Report, supra note 7, at 76.
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the general sales tax regime. Others, however, objected to abolishing
industry-specific taxes on the grounds that the general sales tax
structure already encompasses industry-specific distinctions and industry-specific effective tax rates due to differences in capital structure and different mixes of labor, tangible assets, and intangible assets in creating value in the economy.
Furthermore, the Project was unable to settle on a uniform definition of “telecommunications” for a variety of reasons. Some participants objected to a broad definition because it pulled in too many
providers or services and potentially subjected them to nontax regulation and other consequences. Other representatives expressed frustration with the fact that similar services are being taxed differently
for historical reasons instead of technological or sound tax policybased distinctions. Because Project members were unwilling to deal
with other issues of reform until agreement was reached on the definitional terms, this failure constituted a substantial impediment to
progress on any of the other issues the telecommunications working
group identified and hoped to address (e.g., consolidation of state
and local taxes, the tax treatment of “bundled” service charges, uniform situsing conventions for telecommunications tax purposes,
taxation of prepaid calling cards, and a uniform “telecommunications
resale” exemption form).
g. Implementation issues. The Project considered two basic approaches to implementing any of its potential recommendations:
federal legislation and cooperative state action.59 While the Project
identified several issues that would need to be considered with regard to each approach, it never specified a preferred means of implementation due to the fact that the Project never agreed on any
specific substantive proposal. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that
those who supported federal legislation believed that electronic
commerce was clearly subject to Congress’s Commerce Clause
power to regulate interstate commerce and took the position that
federal legislation, and federal legislation alone, would result in uniform state implementation of any recommended tax policies impacting electronic commerce.
Those who preferred state cooperative action as a means of im-

59. We discuss the issue of implementation of federal legislation regarding state taxation
of electronic commerce—which is the authors’ clear preference, infra Part III. This section
merely summarizes the NTA Project Report’s coverage of the issue.
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plementing the NTA Project’s proposals noted that this method
follows the pattern of states’ enactment of other uniform state legislation (e.g., the Uniform Commercial Code) and that it appropriately avoids federal intervention and preserves state sovereignty over
matters of state tax policy about which the states are better schooled
and more sensitive than the federal government. Nevertheless, these
individuals also noted that federal intervention would be required to
relax the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard enunciated by
the Supreme Court for sales and use tax purposes. It was also suggested that a hybrid approach combining federal and state action
provided a third alternative approach to implementation. Under such
an approach, Congress could approve a multistate compact for
adoption by the states, arguably removing constitutional objections
to such a compact (e.g., based on its alteration of nexus standards for
vendors).
4. Concluding remarks on the potential historical import of the NTA
Project
In the end, the Project was unable to reach an agreement on the
set of issues it explored that satisfied the concerns of both government and business representatives. The inability to reach agreement
may be traced in part to the natural tension that exists in our federal
system between state sovereignty and local authority, on the one
hand, and the needs of a national marketplace for a subfederal tax
regime that is simple, uniform, and easily administered, on the other.
As a consequence, the Steering Committee agreed that the Project’s
Report would be an educational document to provide context for
the work of the Project to date, and most participants completed
work on the Project Report with the stipulated goal of providing the
Report to the ACEC, which had specifically requested it.
After the Project was completed, most of the Project and Steering Committee members turned their focus to the ACEC proceedings. It is clear that the submissions made in response to the ACEC’s
request for proposals relating to state and local taxation of electronic
commerce—many of which were authored by Project participants—
relied on the NTA Report to some degree. Moreover, the issues ad-
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dressed in the proposals submitted to the ACEC60 closely track the
broad categories of issues addressed by the NTA Report, including
simplification of sales and use tax administration, both as a general
matter and by reference to specific technology-based measures; the
redesign or codification of nexus standards, for both sales and use
and other types of state and local taxes; and tax policy-grounded
proposals to improve telecommunications taxation, sourcing conventions, sales and use tax rates, etc.
B. The Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce
1. The creation of the Commission and its charge
As we have already noted, Congress joined the debate over state
taxation of electronic commerce with its adoption in October 1998
of the ITFA.61 Besides imposing limited substantive restraints on the
states’ power to impose taxes on Internet access or to impose “multiple” or “discriminatory taxes” on electronic commerce,62 ITFA established the ACEC. Congress charged the Commission with conducting a thorough study of federal, state, local, and international
taxation of transactions using the Internet and other comparable activities. Among the state tax issues that Congress directed the Commission to study, many of which were currently under consideration by the
NTA Project, were (1) an examination of model state legislation that
would (a) provide uniform definitions of categories of property, goods,
services, or information that are subject to or exempt from sales or use
taxes, and (b) ensure that Internet-related services would be treated in
a tax-neutral manner relative to other sales; (2) an examination of the
effects of taxation (and the absence of taxation) of all interstate sales
transactions on retail businesses and on state and local governments,
including the efforts of state and local governments to collect sales and
use taxes on in-state purchases from out-of-state sellers; and (3) an examination of ways to simplify federal, state, and local taxes on telecommunications services.63 Congress directed the Commission to prepare a report within eighteen months (by April 2000) reflecting the
60.
61.
II.A.2.
62.
63.

See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of ACEC proposals.
Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1101-04, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998); see supra Part
See generally Hellerstein, Internet Tax, supra note 1.
ITFA § 1102(g)(2).
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results of its study, including legislative recommendations.
Although at this writing the Commission’s report has yet to be issued, it is doubtful that the report will make any far-reaching recommendations due to the deep political and philosophical divisions
among members of the Commission64 and to the requirement that any
recommendation of the Commission command a two-thirds supermajority.65 Moreover, whatever the report may recommend, it is Congress—not the Commission—that will determine the ultimate fate of
the questions addressed by the Commission.66 Accordingly, the Commission’s most important legacy may well be the spate of proposals it
stimulated when, in the course of its deliberations, it invited the public
to submit proposals for resolving the problems raised by state and local
taxation of electronic commerce. These proposals, which embody
many of the themes that dominated the NTA Project, are likely to be
the starting point for any serious efforts to address these issues in the
future in Congress, in state legislatures, and in the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”).67 We now
64. The Commission was composed of 19 members, including three representatives
from the federal government (the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and
the United States Trade Representative); eight representatives from state and local governments (including at least one from a state without a sales tax and one from a state without an
income tax); and eight representatives of the electronic commerce industry (including small
business), telecommunications carriers, local retail businesses, and consumer groups. The Senate Majority Leader and the Speaker of the House were given the right to appoint five members each and the Senate Minority Leader and the House Minority Leader were given the right
to appoint three members each. From the outset, the discussions among the Commission
members reflected profound differences in outlook that one observer described as an “ideological circus.” John B. Judis, Taxing Issue, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1999, at 15 (also availalble online at <http://www.tnr.com/archive/1099/101199/judis/101199.html>).
65. “No finding or recommendation shall be included in the report unless agreed to by
at least two-thirds of the members of the Commission.” ITFA § 1103. This means that 13 of
the 19 Commission members, and at least two of the eight business or government representatives must agree to any finding or recommendation for it to be included in the report.
66. Indeed, even before the ACEC completed its work the Senate Budget Committee
held a hearing addressed to many of the issues before the Commission. See Hearing on Internet
Taxation in the New Millenium: Hearing Before the Senate Budget Committee, 106th Cong.
(2000) (available online at 2000 WL 128967) [hereinafter Internet Taxation Hearing].
67. The Executive Committee of NCCUSL, taking note of the fact that the ACEC had
been studying the issues of taxation of the Internet and other remote sellers and that the National Governors’ Association (NGA), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL),
and others perceived a need for simplification of state and local sales and use taxes, resolved
that the NCCUSL President appoint a special committee to (a) review the proposals submitted
to the ACEC and identify what role, if any would be appropriate for NCCUSL; (b) coordinate

44

HEL-FIN

009]

03/29/00 2:05 PM

State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Proposals for Change

turn to an examination and analysis of these proposals.
2. Proposals submitted to the ACEC for taxing and not taxing
electronic commerce
During the course of its deliberations, the ACEC solicited the
submission of proposals directed to the problems raised by the application of state sales tax regimes to Internet-based transactions.68 The
Commission asked those submitting proposals to measure their proposals against the following eighteen criteria, which provide a roadmap to the key issues raised by state taxation of electronic commerce:69
Simplification
1. How does this proposal fundamentally simplify the existing
system of sales tax collection (Some examples may be: common
definitions, single rate per state, clarification of nexus standards,
and so forth)?
2. How does this proposal define, distinguish, and propose to tax
information, digital goods, and services provided electronically over
the Internet?
3. How does this proposal protect against onerous and/or multiple audits?
Taxation
4. Does this proposal impose any taxes on Internet access or new
taxes on Internet sales?
5. Does this proposal leave the net tax burden on consumers unchanged? (Does it impose an obligation to pay taxes where such an

with interested organizations in the process of NCCUSL’s work; (c) determine the availability
of resources necessary to undertake any drafting project; (d) determine the support for and
likelihood of enactment of any uniform act; and (d) recommend a process and, if approved, a
schedule to undertake and complete the project. Resolution of the Executive Committee of
NCCUSL, Jan. 16, 2000 (on file with authors).
68. ACEC, Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce Invites Interested Parties to
Submit Plans (Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/releases/acec1015.
htm> [hereinafter ACEC Press Release].
69. Id. at 1-3.
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obligation does not exist today? Does it reduce or increase state
and local telecommunication taxes? Does it reduce or increase
taxes, licensing fees, or other charges on services designed or used
for access to or use of the Internet?)
6. Does the proposal impose any tax, licensing or reporting requirement, collection obligation or other obligation or fee on parties other than those with a physical presence in a particular state or
political subdivision?
7. What features of the proposal will impact the revenue base of
federal, state, and local governments?
Burden on Sellers
8. Does this proposal remove the financial, logistical, and administrative compliance burdens of sales and use tax collections from
sellers? Does the proposal include any special provisions with respect to small, medium-sized, or start-up businesses?
Discrimination
9. Does the proposal treat purchasers of like products or services
in as like a manner as possible through the implementation of a
policy or system that does not discriminate on the basis of how
people buy?
10. Does the proposal discriminate against out-of-state or remote
vendors or among different categories of such vendors?
International
11. How does this proposal affect U.S. global competitiveness and
the ability of U.S. businesses to compete in a global marketplace?
12. Can this proposal be scaled to the international level?
13. How does this proposal conform to international tax systems,
including those that are based on source rather than destination? Is
this proposal harmonized with the tax systems of America’s trading
partners?
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Technology

14. Is the proposal technologically feasible utilizing widely available software to enable tax collection? If so, what are the initial
costs and the costs for required updates, and who is to bear those
costs?
Privacy
15. Does the proposal protect the privacy of purchasers?
Sovereignty/Local Government Autonomy
16. Does this proposal respect the sovereignty of states and Native
Americans?
17. How does this proposal treat local governments’ autonomy
and their ability to raise a greater or lesser amount of revenues depending on the needs and desires of their citizens?
Constitutional[ity]
18. Is the proposal constitutional?70

The proposals submitted in response to the Commission’s request run the gamut from highly restrictive measures that seem to be
motivated more by a general hostility to taxation than by any
thoughtful consideration of the particular issues raised by sales taxation of electronic commerce, to utopian visions of a world in which
advanced information processing technology coupled with dramatic
simplification of the tax system will permit taxes on transactions in
electronic commerce to be collected seamlessly with a zero burden
on the seller. A comprehensive description and analysis of each of
these proposals would exceed even a law review’s bounds of tolerance for lengthy articles. Consequently, we shall limit our discussion
to a brief description of the essential characteristics of the various
categories of proposals that were presented to the ACEC along with
our views as to their principal strengths and weaknesses.
We should make it clear from the outset that these categories are
not airtight, and a number of proposals fit comfortably in more than

70. Id.
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one category. Indeed, our primary objective in categorizing these
proposals is not to pigeonhole a particular proposal but rather to
identify the key organizing principles that are likely to form the basis
of future discussion of solutions to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce.
a. Radically restrictive proposals. We view as “radically restrictive”
those proposals that would not merely define the terms under which
electronic commerce could be taxed (e.g., prescribing minimum nexus
standards or simplification requirements) or prohibit taxes on a narrow
category of transactions (e.g., Internet access71), but rather would ban
such taxation altogether as applied to a broad range of transactions. We
would place in this category such proposals as the Internet Tax Elimination Act,72 cosponsored by Representatives Kasich and Boehner of
Ohio, and the proposal to prohibit all sales and use taxes on businessto-consumer Internet transactions, advanced by Governor Gilmore of
Virginia.73
The Internet Tax Elimination Act would prohibit the states and
their political subdivisions from imposing “[a]ny sales or use tax on
domestic or foreign goods or services acquired through electronic
commerce.”74 The definition of “electronic commerce” for these purposes75 is all-encompassing. It embraces “any transaction conducted
over the Internet or through Internet access, comprising the sale, lease,
license, offer, or delivery of property, goods, services, or information,
whether or not for consideration, and includes the provision of Inter-

71. Accordingly, we do not regard ITFA as “radically restrictive” although it is restrictive.
72. H.R. 3252, 106th Cong. (1999), discussed supra notes 28-35 and accompanying
text.
73. Governor James Gilmore, No Internet Tax: A Proposal Submitted to the “Policies &
Options” Paper of the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (Nov. 8, 1999)
<http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>. See also Independence Forum, Proposal: That the Internet Be Made an International, National, State, and Local Tax-free, Dutyfree, and Tariff-free Environment (Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; E-Freedom Coalition, The e-Freedom Coalition’s Proposal to
the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>.
74. H.R. 3252, 106th Cong. § 2(b) (1999).
75. The Act is drafted as an amendment to ITFA and thus incorporates all of its definitions.
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net access.”76 Consequently, the Act would cut a broad swath of tax
immunity across state sales tax regimes. It would presumably immunize
from tax not only the typical remote sale (e.g., the purchase of a book
from Amazon.com), but also the local purchase of goods and services
as long as the transaction was “conducted . . . through Internet access.” Thus, a customer presumably could purchase a car tax-free if,
after negotiating the deal in the showroom, the dealer directed the
customer to a convenient on-premises kiosk where the customer could
consummate the transaction (indicating his or her acceptance)
“through Internet access” with a click of a mouse.
Other than simplicity, the Internet Tax Elimination Act and kindred proposals have little to offer from the standpoint of sound tax
policy. Indeed, a more appropriate name for the Internet Tax Elimination Act would be the “Sales Tax Elimination Act.” Only those vendors who failed to steer their sales through an Internet-connected device would still be required to collect sales tax. The result for sales tax
revenues would be devastating. Moreover, insofar as bricks-and-mortar
retailers continued to collect sales tax, there would be competitive inequalities between vendors of identical products, thus violating the goal
of economic neutrality in taxation. As Governor Engler of Michigan
testified at a Senate Budget Committee hearing addressed to Internet
taxation, “if we gravitate towards a tax system that creates a specific
loophole for retailers that use the Internet, we risk creation of a federal
policy that favors Internet vendors at the expense of Main Street stores
and home town merchants.”77
b. Moderately restrictive proposals. In contrast to the radically restrictive proposals that would immunize a significant segment of
economic activity involving electronic commerce from sales or use
tax, several more moderate proposals submitted to the ACEC would
impose specifically defined limits on the states’ power to tax electronic commerce. For example, Dean Andal, Vice Chairman of the
California State Board of Equalization and a member of the ACEC,
has proposed a congressionally imposed uniform jurisdictional standard applicable to electronic commerce.78 The eCommerce Coali76. ITFA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1104(3).
77. Internet Taxation Hearing, supra note 66 (testimony of Michigan Governor John
Engler).
78. See Dean Andal, A Uniform Jurisdictional Standard: Applying the Substantial
Physical Presence Standard to Electronic Commerce (Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>.
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tion, a broad-based coalition of businesses including Cisco Systems,
Inc., Citigroup, Microsoft Corporation, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
urged the Commission to recommend congressional legislation requiring and establishing standards for state-initiated simplification of
the current sales and use tax system.79
From a tax policy perspective, the merits of these more targeted
proposals depends on an analysis of their specific terms. Dean Andal’s
proposal removes some of the uncertainty surrounding the question
whether an out-of-state vendor has sufficient nexus in the state to be
subject to a sales or use tax collection obligation, and for that reason it
should be applauded. However, it does so by erecting higher nexus
standards than exist under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents and
therefore may be subject to criticism on that ground. Moreover, in the
eyes of at least one of the coauthors,80 the physical-presence standard of
nexus that Dean Andal endorses makes little sense from the standpoint
of sound tax policy. As for the eCommerce Coalition’s endorsement of
congressionally guided sales and use tax simplification, we wholeheartedly agree with most other observers that simplification is a worthy
goal. The devil, of course, is in the details, both in terms of their substance and implementation, and the eCommerce Coalition understandably left those details to future consideration.
c. Simplification proposals. If there is a theme that unites many of
the proposals offered to the ACEC, it is that simplification of the
structure of existing state sales and use tax regimes is an essential element of a constructive solution to the problems spawned by state taxation of electronic commerce. Indeed, the eCommerce Coalition’s proposal discussed above focuses largely on simplification, as do many of
the other proposals.81 Even those proposals that do not focus primarily

79. See eCommerce Coalition, Simplification of the State and Local Sales and Use Tax
System (Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>.
80. Namely, Professor Hellerstein, whose views on this issue (along with those of 170
other academic tax professionals) are discussed further below. See infra note 91 and accompanying text .
81. See, e.g., American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Untitled Proposal (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; Wayne Eggert,
Electronic Commerce; Modernization and Sales Tax Simplification Proposal (Nov. 1, 1999)
<http:// www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; Thomas A. McGuire, The Zip Code
Tax: A Proposal for Simplified Sales Tax on E-Commerce (Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Radical Simplification of
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on simplification typically include simplification as an integral part of
their prescription.82
There is, of course, a good reason for the emphasis on simplification. It is universally recognized that the existing framework of state
and local sales taxation is inordinately complex and imposes enormous
burdens on interstate vendors. It is likewise recognized that the advent
of electronic commerce has exacerbated these difficulties. Consequently, virtually every proposal for addressing the problems raised by
sales and use taxation of electronic commerce—other than those that
would bar such taxation altogether—has made significant simplification
a cornerstone of its blueprint for change. We join the chorus of those
who believe that dramatic simplification and uniformity—in the tax
base, the tax rate, and in administration—is a necessity of any meaningful solution to the problem of state sales and use taxation of electronic commerce (and, indeed, to nonelectronic commerce as well).
What separates the various simplification proposals, and what deserves some further comment, are the questions whether simplification
should be the result of voluntary state action or congressional mandate
and whether the simplification should be linked with a relaxation of
Quill’s physical presence rule for collection of the use tax by remote
sellers. With respect to the first question, we would favor whichever
path led most quickly to the desired result. Although we appreciate the
states’ concerns about congressional action that compromises their
sovereignty, we are also skeptical about the states’ ability to create a
truly simple and uniform system of sales taxation on the basis of the
voluntary action of forty-five different state legislatures. One need look
no further than adoption and implementation of the Uniform Division
of Income for Tax Purposes Act—which has been adopted by only a
minority of the states imposing income taxes, whose uniform provisions have been modified by individual states, and which is administered differently from state to state—to know that reliance on voluntary
state action to create uniform tax rules is a risky business. While there
State Sales and Use Taxes: The Prerequisite for an Expanded Duty to Collect Use Tax on Remote
Sales (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org./proposal.htm>.
82. See, e.g., Committee on State Taxation, Proposal Related to the Modification and
Simplification of State and Local Sales and Use Taxes to the Advisory Commission on Electronic
Commerce (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>;
David E. Hardesty, Sales and Use Tax Plan: Creation of the Multistate Tax Service (Nov. 11,
1999) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; North American Retail
Dealers Association, Proposal Related to Electronic Commerce Taxes (visited Mar. 8, 2000)
<http://www.ecommercecommission. org/proposal.htm>.
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may be difficulties in obtaining congressional passage of broad-based
legislation prescribing the conditions under which the states may tax
electronic commerce, we believe that such legislation, if drafted with
appropriate sensitivity to concerns of state sovereignty, would more effectively and expeditiously achieve the goal of uniformity in this domain than would voluntary state action.
As to the second question—whether simplification should be
linked to an abandonment of the physical-presence rule of nexus for
use tax collection purposes—one of us is on record as favoring both
simplification and abandonment of the physical-presence rule as guiding principles for taxation of electronic commerce.83 However, both of
us believe that simplification would be desirable in any event. Indeed,
dramatic simplification of the sales and use tax structure could undermine the argument on which the Commerce Clause nexus arguments
of remote sellers’ rests, namely, that collection of taxes on remote sales
is simply too difficult under the present system. Consequently, if there
were dramatic simplification of the states’ sales and use tax structures,
even without the formal relaxation of the physical-presence rule of
Quill, it is possible that the rule would die a quiet death once its analytical underpinnings were removed.
d. Technology proposals. A number of proposals submitted to the
ACEC rely on technology to do the heavy lifting in resolving the
problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce.84 The com83. We describe these principles below, infra Part II.3.
84. See, e.g., Robert D. Atkinson & Randolph H. Court, Internet Taxation: A Software
Solution (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>;
David Polatseck, Sales Tax Simplification Proposal (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; Alistair Kelman, The easyClear White Paper (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; Ronald E.
Knox, Proposal to Address Issues of State and Local Taxation of Internet Transactions for the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; David Hardesty, Sales Use Tax Plan:
Creation of the Multistate Tax Service (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; William F. Willbrand, Jr., Sales/Use Tax Settlement
System: A Proposal for the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (visited March 4, 2000)
<http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; Michael O. Leavitt, Streamlined
Sales Tax System for the 21st Century (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; Sales Tax Clearinghouse, STC Proposal to
the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (Nov. 12, 1999) <http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; TaxNet Systems, Inc., Sales and Use Tax Collection on Interstate Purchases (Nov. 8, 1999) <http://www.ecommercecommission.
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mon theme of these proposals is that the software technology exists (or
will soon exist) that will seamlessly integrate the tax payment process
into the electronic commerce transaction. As one of the proposals
baldly puts it, “Merchant Swipes Card-Tax is Electronically Paid.”85
These proposals also promise to perform this function at a moderate
cost, or at least at a cost that will be borne by the taxing authority
rather than by the merchant.86
We are very hopeful that these proposals can in fact deliver what
they promise. If they can, they will play an essential role, along with
simplification, in paving the way towards a workable solution to the
problem of taxing electronic commerce. For the moment, however, we
believe it is worth keeping in mind that if wishes were horses then beggars would ride. Unless and until it can be demonstrated that technology exists that is capable, among other things, of determining the appropriate taxing authority, determining the taxability of the particular
purchase or purchaser, processing this information on a real time basis
and seamlessly integrating it with the credit card or other payment
mechanism, and doing all this at a reasonable cost, we must remain
cautious—but nonetheless hopeful—about the ability of technology to
resolve or help resolve the problems of taxing electronic commerce.
e. Origin-based proposals. Some observers have suggested that the
solution to the problem of taxing electronic commerce lies in reconfiguring the sales tax as an origin-based tax rather than a destinationbased tax.87 According to supporters of these origin-based proposals,
their beauty lies in their ability to cope with two of the key problems
facing the existing destination-based system: identification of the state
of the purchaser and, once that state has been identified, establishing
nexus over the seller in that state so that the seller can be required to

org/proposal.htm>; Taxware International Inc., Adapting Tax Technology to the Internet—the
eCommerce Transaction Tax Server (Nov. 12, 1999) <http://www.ecommercecommission.
org/proposal.htm>.
85. TaxNet Systems, Inc., Sales and Use Tax Collection on Interstate Purchases (Nov.
8,1999) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>.
86. See, e.g., National Governors Association et al., Streamlined Sales Tax System for the
21st Century (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>.
87. See Andrew Wagner & Wade Anderson, Proposal of an Origin Based Tax Solution for
the Possible Taxation of Digitized Products Sold Over the Internet (Nov. 8, 1999)
<http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.htm>; see also Debate: NGA’s Shafroth,
Heritage’s Thierer on “Streamlined” Proposal, Origin-Basing for E-Commerce, 18 ST. TAX
NOTES 279 (2000); Terry Ryan & Eric Miethke, The Seller-State Option: Solving the Electronic
Commerce Dilemma, 15 ST. TAX NOTES 881 (1988).
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collect the tax. Under an origin-based system, there is no need to
identify the state of the purchaser and there will always be nexus in the
taxing state where the seller is located.
Notwithstanding the apparent elegance and simplicity of an originbased sales tax, it suffers from several fundamental defects. First, an origin-based sales tax is inconsistent with the basic philosophy underlying
the sales tax as a levy on consumption rather than production. Transforming the sales tax from a tax imposed by the state of the consumption of goods and services to a tax imposed by the state of the production of goods and services effectively transforms the sales tax into a
different type of levy conceptually and economically. For this reason, it
creates a second fundamental difficulty, namely, a “race to the bottom,” as vendors of goods and services shift their sources of production
to states with no or low sales taxes. Thus, while source-based taxes may
appear attractive from an administrative standpoint, “in an open economy, avoidance through the mobility of capital could be so great that
there would be little remaining base to administer.”88
Despite these objections to an origin-based sales tax, it could well
provide a useful mechanism for dealing with the most difficult problem
raised by electronic commerce, namely, the sale of digital products to
consumers.89 In this context, the compliance costs of administering a
destination-based system may be so great that “[t]he administrative
costs of conceptual rigor are too great.”90 Accordingly, one should not
rule out the use of an origin-based sales tax if employed selectively in
circumstances under which a destination-based sales tax cannot be administered at acceptable costs.

88. William F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, The Sales Tax and Electronic Commerce: So
What’s New?, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 573, 575 (1997).
89. In our judgment, administering a destination-based sales tax system for the sale of
tangible products, whose destination can ordinarily be determined, and for sales to businesses,
who frequently self-assess use taxes and whose purchases are often audited, poses less daunting
problems than administering such a system with respect to sales of digital products to consumers. Indeed, at least some of the origin-based proposals are limited to sales of digital products.
See Wagner & Anderson, supra note 87.
90. Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 685 F.2d 212, 217
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
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3. Concluding thoughts on the ACEC proposals and guiding principles
for taxation of electronic commerce
The proposals submitted to the ACEC, like the various proposals
that were examined during the NTA Project, contain much food for
thought that will take some time to digest. For the immediate future,
we believe the most pressing matter, which will likely determine
whether there is meaningful progress towards a broad-based solution
to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce, is the
endorsement, by a majority of concerned parties, of a set of principles
to govern future deliberations in this domain. We believe that a worthy
effort in this direction has already been undertaken. Over 170 academic
tax policy specialists—economists and professors of tax law (including
two winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics)—have endorsed an
“Appeal for Fair and Equal Taxation of Electronic Commerce.” This
appeal sets forth four general principles that should guide any effort to
deal with sales and use taxation of electronic commerce.91 These principles are:
1. Electronic commerce should not permanently be treated differently from other commerce. There is no principled reason for a
permanent exemption for electronic commerce. Electronic commerce should be taxed neither more nor less heavily than other
commerce.
2. Remote sales, including electronic commerce, should, to the
extent possible, be taxed by the state of destination of sales, regardless of whether the vendor has a physical presence in the state.
In limited cases, where it is impossible to determine the destination
of sales of digital content to households, it may be necessary to
substitute a surrogate system. In no case should taxation of remote
electronic commerce be limited to origin-based taxation, which
would induce a “race to the bottom” and, in effect, no taxation at
all.
3. There must be enough simplification of sales and use taxes to
make destination-based taxation of sales feasible. Such simplification might include, for example, unification of the tax base across
states, unification of tax rates within states, and/or sourcing of sales
91. State Sales and Use Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Simplification is Needed; A
Statutory Exemption is Not: Testimony Before the Senate Budget Committee, 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of Charles E. McLure, Jr., Hoover Institution Stanford University)

55

HEL-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

03/29/00 2:05 PM

[2000

only to the state level, as well as simplification of administrative
procedures.
4. A means must be found to eliminate burdens of compliance on
sellers making only small amounts of sales in a state. These might
include software-based systems made available at state expense,
more realistic vendor discounts, and/or de minimis rules.92

III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON CONGRESSIONAL
POWER TO LEGISLATE REGARDING STATE TAXATION OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
On the assumption that any broad-based solution to the problems
raised by state taxation of electronic commerce will require congressional action (whether in the form of federal legislation or congressional consent to a state compact),93 the question we explore here is
whether there are federal constitutional restraints that might limit
Congress’s ability to resolve these issues.94 Any effort to design a solution to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce
will almost certainly require congressional action of some kind. As
noted above, most of the proposals for reform in this area have suggested that the states should be required to adopt uniform definitions
of goods and services in taxing or exempting goods and services sold in
electronic commerce and to impose only one rate per state.95 It is difficult to imagine that this result can be achieved without congressional
legislation.96 Similarly, many observers believe that any sensible ap92. Id. The academic coauthor of this article, who is a signatory of the statement,
wholeheartedly agrees with all of these principles. The nonacademic coauthor, while generally
sympathetic to these principles, does not wholeheartedly agree with all of them.
93. We recognize that there are some that might challenge this assumption, but, for the
reasons suggested below, we believe the assumption is a reasonable one.
94. The following discussion draws freely from Walter Hellerstein, Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation to Legislate Regarding State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, NAT’L TAX J. (forthcoming 2000).
95. See supra Part II; see also Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce,
52 TAX. L. REV. 425 (1997); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Electronic Commerce and the Tax Assignment Problem: Preserving State Sovereignty in a Digital World, 14 ST. TAX NOTES 1169 (1998);
Traci G. Wright & Jesse Rothstein, Taxes and the Internet: Updating Tax Structures for a Wired
World, 17 ST. TAX NOTES 491 (1999).
96. The suggestion that the states can achieve this goal through voluntary efforts is, in our
view, unrealistic. One need look no further than our experience under the Multistate Tax Com-
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proach to taxation of electronic commerce must modify the rule of
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,97 that out-of-state vendors without physical presence in the state may not be compelled to collect use taxes on
sales to local consumers, regardless of the nature or extent of their sales
into the state.98 Congressional action will clearly be required to alter
the rule of Quill.
A. Commerce Clause Considerations
The question whether Congress possesses power under the Commerce Clause to provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of
state taxation of electronic commerce is, at first glance, an easy one.
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several States.”99 The Supreme Court has interpreted that power in sweeping terms. Thus in the Shreveport Rate
Case,100 which sustained Congress’s power to regulate local rates because they affected interstate rates, the Court declared:
It is unnecessary to repeat what has frequently been said by this
court with respect to the complete and paramount character of the
power confided to Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. It is of the essence of this power that, where it exists, it
dominates. . . . By virtue of the comprehensive terms of the grant,
the authority of Congress is at all times adequate to meet the varying exigencies that arise and to protect the national interest by securing the freedom of interstate commercial intercourse from local
control.101

The Court has also sustained the legislation in the following areas
as legitimate exercises of Congress’s power to regulate interstate compact, which is designed to “promote uniformity or compatibility in significant components of tax
systems” to justify such skepticism. Only about half the states have joined the Compact, although a
number of others are associate members. Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, STATE AND
LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 566 (6th ed. 1997). Moreover, in implementing the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (“UDITPA”), which is embodied in the Compact, many states have adopted their own variations on the statute, id. at 567-69, thereby undermining the consistency that the Compact and the statute were designed to promote. Moreover, the
states differ in the extent to which they have adopted the Multistate Tax Commission’s regulations
interpreting UDITPA. Id.
97. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
98. See supra note 95.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
100. Houston E&W Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
101. Id. at 350-51.
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merce: (1) the amount of wheat a farmer can grow for his own consumption;102 (2) discriminatory practices in local hotels and restaurants;103 and (3) local criminal activity.104
Furthermore, Congress’s authority not only to restrict but also to
expand state power to tax or regulate interstate commerce, by comparison to the restraints on such power that would otherwise exist under
the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional legislation, is well settled. Thus in Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Benjamin,105 the Court sustained a South Carolina insurance premiums
tax imposed solely on foreign insurance companies—a levy that clearly
would have been struck down under the Commerce Clause if Congress
had not consented to such legislation in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
In so holding, the Court declared:
The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely without
reference to coordinated actions of the states is not restricted, except as the Constitution expressly provides, by any limitation which
forbids it to discriminate against interstate commerce and in favor
of local trade. Its plenary scope enables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has done frequently and for a great variety of reasons.106

From the foregoing, one might reasonably conclude that there
could be no serious objection to Congress’s exercise of its power under
the Commerce Clause to forge a comprehensive solution to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce. Because it has
plenary power over the channels of interstate commerce, “Congress
may keep the way open, confine it broadly or closely, or close it entirely, subject only to the [limitations]”107 that the Constitution imposes on Congress’s own power. Indeed, in Moorman Manufacturing
Co. v. Bair,108 the Court explicitly indicated that Congress possesses
power to legislate uniform state tax rules among the states—a subject
102. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
103. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
104. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
105. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
106. Id. at 434 (footnote omitted).
107. Id.
108. 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978).
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of particular relevance to any legislative solution to the problems raised
by sales and use taxation of electronic commerce. Thus, the Court observed that “[i]t is clear that the legislative power granted to Congress
by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the
enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules
for the division of income.”109
Moreover, it is equally clear that Congress may consent to state
legislation that would be an integral part of a rational solution to the
problem of taxing electronic commerce, even if such legislation would
be unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause in the absence of such consent.110 As the Court observed in Quill itself, which
reaffirmed the dormant Commerce Clause principle that the physical
presence of an out-of state vendor is an essential prerequisite of a state’s
power to require the vendor to collect the state’s use tax, “Congress
is . . . free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may
burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use
taxes.”111
1. Recent decisions invalidating congressional exercises of the
Commerce Power
Despite Congress’s broad authority under the Commerce Clause
to legislate in the domain of state taxation, one might argue that some
of the Court’s more recent opinions reflect a less expansive view of
congressional power to restrict state action and that they require rethinking of the position articulated above.112 Specifically, in United
States v. Lopez,113 the Court held that Congress lacks power under the
Commerce Clause to prohibit possession of firearms in school zones
because possession of a gun in a local school zone does not affect interstate commerce. And in Printz v. United States,114 the Court held that
Congress lacks the power under the Commerce Clause to require state
officials to conduct background checks on prospective gun purchasers
under the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act. Do these decisions
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
111. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
112. Indeed, such an argument has been advanced. See Richard D. Nicholson, Preemption of State Sales and Use Taxes on Goods Purchased Over the Internet: An Unconstitutional
Mission, 18 ST. TAX NOTES 213 (2000).
113. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
114. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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seriously inhibit Congress in its ability to fashion a solution to the
problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce? In our
judgment, the answer to this question is no, although they do suggest
that certain forms of congressional action would lie outside Congress’s
commerce power.
a. United States v. Lopez. In Lopez, even though the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, it did so in an opinion
that reaffirmed, rather than discredited, the essential contours of the
Court’s affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine. Thus the Court, after
summarizing the “era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly
expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that
Clause,”115 identified “three broad categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power.”116
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.117

The Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 fell
within none of these categories. It clearly was not a regulation of the
use of the channels of interstate commerce nor was it an attempt to
prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the
channels of commerce. The only close question, in the Court’s opinion, was whether the activity that Congress sought to regulate “substantially affects” interstate commerce. Here, too, the Court concluded
that the legislation fell outside of even its most expansive precedents—
including those involving regulation of intrastate coal mining, intrastate
extortionate credit transactions, restaurants using substantial interstate
supplies, inns and motels catering to interstate guests, and production
and consumption of homegrown wheat.118 The Gun-Free School

115.
116.
117.
118.

60

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
See id. at 559-60. See also supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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Zones Act, by contrast, “has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms.”119 Nor was there any “jurisdictional element”120 that would ensure that the firearm in question affected interstate commerce (i.e.,
there was no requirement in the statute that the guns banned from the
school zone be shipped or transported in interstate commerce).
In short, “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might . . . substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce.”121 In the Court’s view, “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the
sort retained by the States.”122
Lopez does not impose significant restraints on Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause to legislate regarding state taxation of
electronic commerce. One cannot seriously maintain that electronic
commerce does not “substantially affect” interstate commerce within
the meaning of the precedents that the Court explicitly reaffirmed in
Lopez. Indeed, if, as the Court reiterated, such activities as intrastate
extortionate credit transactions, restaurants using substantial interstate
supplies, inns and motels catering to interstate guests, and production
and consumption of homegrown wheat “substantially affect” interstate
commerce, electronic commerce would appear to be a “lesser included
offense.” Moreover, one could clearly draft congressional legislation as
a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce—the Internet—
that would fall squarely within another well-accepted basis for the
exercise of the congressional commerce power.
b. Printz v. United States. In Printz, the Court held that certain
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act commanding state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers exceeded Congress’s authority. In contrast to Lopez, the focus of the controversy in
Printz was not whether regulation of the activity in question—the
distribution of firearms—fell within the scope of Congress’s power to
regulate interstate commerce. Indeed, the Court did not appear to

119.
120.
121.
122.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Id.
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take issue with the dissent’s observation that “there can be no question that the [Commerce Clause] adequately supports the regulation
of commerce in handguns effected by the Brady Act.”123
Instead, the key issue in Printz was whether state and local law
enforcement officers could be required to implement a federal regulatory regime. The Court in Printz, gave an unequivocally negative answer to this question:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the
States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or
benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.124

What implications does this holding have on congressional power
to enact legislation affecting state taxation of electronic commerce?
First, it clearly indicates that Congress may not rely on state and local
tax personnel to administer a federal regulatory scheme directed to
state taxation of electronic commerce. Up to now, discussions of alternative federal legislative solutions to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce have not seriously entertained the possibility of enlisting state and local personnel to implement a federal
regulatory regime. Printz makes it clear that any such proposal would
be dead on arrival from a constitutional standpoint, and we should not
waste our time even considering any such proposal.
Second, Printz does not appear to jeopardize the constitutionality
of the type of legislation that has been suggested in connection with
state taxation of electronic commerce. For example, Congress could
presumably enact a statute forbidding the states from imposing sales
and use taxes on electronic commerce unless they (1) limited their tax
to one rate per state, (2) adopted uniform definitions of taxable and
nontaxable items prescribed by Congress, (3) simplified their administrative procedures for collecting taxes in ways specified by Congress,
and (4) compelled out-of-state vendors to collect taxes only if their instate sales exceeded de minimis levels. At the same time, Congress
123. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 941 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 935.
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could permit the states to require remote vendors to collect such taxes
regardless of the physical presence of the out-of-state vendor in the
state.
Legislation of this nature falls squarely within the traditional form
of congressional Commerce Clause legislation limiting or consenting
to state taxation. It would prescribe the conditions under which the
states can tax particular activities in interstate commerce, just as it has
done in Public Law 86-272,125 which limits the states’ power to tax income from interstate commerce, and more recently in the ITFA,126
which limits the states’ power to tax certain forms of electronic commerce.127 And it would consent to the taxation of interstate commerce,
just as it has done with respect to state taxation of the insurance industry.128 There is nothing in Printz that casts any doubt on the constitutionality of such legislation, because such legislation does not “compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”129
c. Reno v. Condon. The Court’s recent decision in Reno v. Condon,130 which sustained Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause
to enact the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), reinforces the foregoing reading of Lopez and Printz. The DPPA arose out
of Congress’s concern that many states that routinely require drivers
125. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994).
126. ITFA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1101-04, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998); see generally
Hellerstein, Internet Tax, supra note 1.
127. Over the years, Congress has exercised its commerce power to limit state tax power in a
number of contexts. In adopting the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 54, 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (Supp. III 1997), Congress prohibited the
states from taxing railroad property more heavily than other commercial and industrial property.
Congress subsequently extended similar protection to motor carriers and to air carriers. See 49
U.S.C. § 14502 (Supp. III 1997); 49 U.S.C. § 40116 (1994). In amending the securities acts in
1975, Congress imposed limitations on the power of states to levy stock transfer taxes. See Pub. L.
No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d) (1994). Federal legislation also prohibits the states
from imposing user charges in connection with the carriage of persons in air commerce, 49 U.S.C.
§ 40116(b) (1994); it “supersede[s] any and all State taxes insofar as they now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan” instituted pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994); it prohibits the states from imposing electrical energy taxes discriminating against out-of-state purchasers, 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1994); it prohibits localities from
taxing providers of direct-to-home satellite services, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. VI, § 602, 47
U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1997); and it prohibits state and local governments from taxing flights of
commercial aircraft or any activity or service aboard such aircraft unless the aircraft takes off or lands
in the taxing jurisdiction, 49 U.S.C. § 40116(c) (1994).
128. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
129. Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992)).
130. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
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and automobile owners to furnish personal information to state motor
vehicle departments had been selling this personal information to individuals and businesses. In adopting the DPPA, Congress regulated the
disclosure of such personal information. Among other things, the
DPPA established a regulatory scheme that restricted the states’ ability
to disclose a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent.
Personal information was defined as “any information ‘that identifies
an individual, [with an exception for] information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver’s status.’ ”131 The DPPA’s ban did
not apply to drivers who consented to release of their data, and the Act
established rules governing how such consent could lawfully be obtained. The DPPA also contained a number of exceptions to the prohibition against nonconsensual disclosures.
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the DPPA as
“incompatible with the principles of federalism.”132 The Court first addressed the claim that Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the DPPA. Relying on its opinion in Lopez,
where it had identified three broad categories of activity that Congress
could regulate under its commerce power,133 the Court found that the
personal information that the DPPA regulates fell within the second
category of activity that Congress could regulate under its commerce
power—“things in interstate commerce.”134
The Court observed that the personal information that the states
have historically sold was used by insurers, direct marketers, and others
engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information was also used in the stream of commerce
by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate
commerce. Accordingly, the Court concluded: “Because drivers’ information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release
into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation.”135
The Condon Court’s treatment of Lopez supports the view that Lopez is no obstacle to congressional legislation regulating state taxation
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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See supra text accompanying note 117.
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of electronic commerce. Since electronic commerce invariably involves
an “article of commerce” (e.g., the purchase and/or transfer of a digital or nondigital product over the Internet), there can be no question
that “its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient
to support congressional regulation.” Lopez is therefore no more an
obstacle to congressional legislation limiting state taxation of electronic
commerce than it was an obstacle in Condon to congressional legislation limiting state sale of personal information in interstate commerce.
The fact that Congress possessed legislative authority over the
subject matter of the DPPA did not end the dispute in Condon. In
Printz, the Court held the Brady Handgun Prevention Act invalid not
because Congress lacked authority over commerce in handguns but
rather because the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism preclude the federal government from “issu[ing] directives requiring the
States to address particular problems”136 or “command[ing] the States’
officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”137
South Carolina claimed that this is exactly what the federal government
had done in the DPPA by thrusting upon the states the day-to-day responsibility for administering its complex provisions and thereby making state officials unwilling instruments of federal policy. Specifically,
South Carolina complained that the DPPA required its employees to
learn and apply the Act’s substantive provisions and that this would
consume the employees’ time and the state’s resources.
But the Court disagreed. While acknowledging that the DPPA
might require time and effort on the part of state employees, the Court
concluded that the case was governed not by Printz but by South
Carolina v. Baker,138 which sustained Congress’s power to enact legislation that prohibited the states from issuing unregistered bonds. The
Court declared:
Like the statute at issue in Baker, the DPPA does not require the
States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The
DPPA regulates the States as the owners of databases. It does not
require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.139

136.
137.
138.
139.

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
Id.
485 U.S. 505 (1988).
Condon, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
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The Court’s decision in Condon reaffirms the conclusion that
Printz does not constitute a significant limitation on federal legislation
directed to state taxation of electronic commerce. As noted above,140
the type of federal legislation that has been suggested in connection
with state taxation of electronic commerce does not “require the States
in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens,” “to enact
any laws or regulations,” or to “require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.” Rather it
would simply forbid the states from taxing electronic commerce unless
they complied with congressionally prescribed conditions, a traditional
form of federal legislation that lies outside the purview of Printz.141
2. Eleventh Amendment limitations on Congress’s power to legislate
under the Commerce Clause
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”142 In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has read
the Eleventh Amendment’s bar against suits in federal court by nonresidents against nonconsenting states as reflecting a broad, constitutionally-based principle of state sovereign immunity that Congress
may not override through the exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause and other constitutional grants of congressional power.
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,143 the question was whether
Congress, through the exercise of its commerce power, could
authorize suits in federal court by Indian tribes against states that
had not consented to such suits. In answering that question in the
negative, the Court observed that “[f]or over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting
States ‘was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing
140. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
141. As the Court declared in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992):
“[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause,
we have recognized Congress’s power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.” Id.
142. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
143. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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the judicial power of the United States.’ ”144 Moreover, even though
the Court had held just six years earlier that Congress could,
through the exercise of its commerce power, override the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity and create federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting states,145 the Court in Seminole overruled
this decision in concluding that Congress lacked such power. The
Court declared:
[T]oday, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like
the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive
control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.146

The Court reaffirmed and expanded the teaching of Seminole in
three decisions handed down in 1999. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank (“Florida Prepaid”),147 the Court held that Congress could not constitutionally abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims of patent infringement in federal court. Tracking its reasoning in Seminole,
the Court held that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent
Clause (nor any other power granted to Congress under Article I of
the Constitution) provided a basis for overriding state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court recognized in Florida Prepaid (as it had in Seminole)
that Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment because “the Fourteenth
Amendment, by expanding federal power at the expense of state
autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal
power struck by the Constitution.”148 Nevertheless, the Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment’s authorization for “appropriate legislation” to protect against deprivations of property without due
process of law did not provide Congress with authority to abrogate

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72.
119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
Id. at 2205 (quoting Seminole, 517 U.S. at 59).
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state sovereign immunity, because there was nothing in the legislative
record to suggest that state patent infringement had caused “ ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the sort
Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation.”149
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board (“College Savings”),150 a companion case to Florida Prepaid, involved a suit against a state instrumentality for allegedly engaging in unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act. The
Court reiterated that Congress’s Article I powers (here an amendment
to the Lanham Act) were insufficient to override state sovereign immunity; it found the Fourteenth Amendment equally unavailing as a
basis for abrogating the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity because there was no deprivation of any property at issue; and it overruled
Parden v. Terminal Railway,151 which held that a state, by engaging in
activities that Congress had regulated under the Commerce Clause,
was deemed to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court. Rejecting the “constructive-waiver experiment of Parden” as
“ill conceived,”152 the Court declared that a state waiver of sovereign
immunity, like the waiver of any other constitutional right, must be an
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.”153
In Alden v. Maine,154 the third of the 1999 trilogy of state sovereign immunity cases, the Court held that Congress lacks the power
under Article I of the Constitution to subject nonconsenting states to
private suits for damages in state courts. The petitioners in the case,
state probation officers, had sued Maine for a violating the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act in federal court. Because Maine had not consented to such suit, the federal district court dismissed the suit on the
basis of Seminole. The Court concluded that the states’ immunity from
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty they enjoyed before the
adoption of the Constitution, and that they retained such immunity
except as altered by the Constitution or its amendments. The Court
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.
Id. at 2229 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2240 (1999).
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further concluded, based on an analysis of history, precedent, and the
structure of the Constitution, that Article I of the Constitution had not
granted Congress the power to abrogate states’ immunity from private
suits in their own courts. The consequence of the Court’s decision in
Alden was that the probation officers were barred from suing Maine in
either federal or state court, despite a federal statute providing them
with substantive protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Court observed that its holding in Alden—that the state officers could not sue the state in either federal or state court to vindicate
their rights under federal law—“does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law.”155
The Court further noted that sovereign immunity did not bar all judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution: first, many states
have enacted statutes consenting to suit and thus waiving sovereign
immunity; second, the United States (as distinguished from private litigants) may bring a suit against nonconsenting states to assure the vindication of federal rights in federal and state courts; third, the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment required the states to surrender a portion of their immunity from suit (at least when rights protected by that
amendment are at stake); fourth, the principle of state immunity does
not extend to lesser entities (e.g., municipalities or other governmental
entities that are not arms of the state); and, fifth, sovereign immunity
does not bar suit against state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief
in state or federal courts.156 These caveats to the contrary notwithstanding, it is plain that Alden (along with Seminole, Florida Prepaid,
and College Savings) has significantly limited Congress’s power to subject unwilling states to suit in federal or state court.
Finally, in its most recent foray into state sovereign immunity and
the Eleventh Amendment, the Court held that Congress lacked the
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the
states’ immunity from suit in federal court in actions brought against
states for violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967.157 The Court reaffirmed its commitment to the principles articulated in Seminole and the trilogy of 1999 cases that Congress lacks
the power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign
immunity and that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immu-

155. Id. at 2266.
156. See General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
157. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
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nity under the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment
unless such legislation is “appropriate legislation” to remedy substantive violations of the amendment. In order for legislation to satisfy the
latter standard, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.”158
Applying this “congruence and proportionality test,” the Court
concluded that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was not
“appropriate legislation” under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Court observed that age discrimination violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if it is unrelated to a legitimate state interest and that it had in fact rejected
claims that age discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause on
three separate occasions. Hence, the ADEA’s broad bar against all age
discrimination “prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under
the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.”159 Second, the
Court found little evidence that states were in fact engaged in age discrimination and that “Congress’s 1974 extension of the Act to the
States was an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential
problem.”160 Accordingly, the Court concluded that “[i]n light of the
indiscriminate scope of the Act’s substantive requirements, and the lack
of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination, . . .
the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”161 The ADEA’s purported abrogation of the
states’ sovereign immunity was therefore invalid.
What are the implications of all this for congressional legislation directed to state taxation of electronic commerce? First, it is apparent
that these decisions deprive Congress of the power to create a federal
158. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
159. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647.
160. Id. at 649.
161. Id. at 650. It is worth noting that the Court’s conclusion that Congress lacked the
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the provisions of the ADEA to
the states did not overrule its earlier determination that Congress possessed power under the
Commerce Clause to extend the ADEA’s provisions to the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 243 (1983). Nevertheless, the Commerce Clause, as distinguished from section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not provide Congress with authority to override the state’s
sovereign immunity. See supra text accompanying note 148.

70

HEL-FIN

009]

03/29/00 2:05 PM

State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Proposals for Change

or state judicial remedy for private litigants against nonconsenting
states to vindicate whatever rights it may establish under its commerce
powers. Second, it seems equally apparent that Congress would be unsuccessful in attempting to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment for
these purposes. We doubt that there is any more evidence in the context of state taxation of electronic commerce than there was in the
context of state patent infringement in Florida Prepaid or of age discrimination in Kimel that the states have caused “ ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the sort Congress has
faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation.”162
Does this mean that we should fold our tents and go home because, whatever substantive rules Congress may enact with respect to
state taxation of electronic commerce under the Commerce Clause, it
is helpless when it comes to creating a federal or state remedy for private litigants to enforce those rules against nonconsenting states? The
answer, in our judgment, is an unequivocal “no.” For one thing, as the
Court itself observed, the existence of sovereign immunity “does not
confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law.”163 The states and their officers are bound by
their obligations under the Constitution, and one cannot assume they
will lightly disregard those obligations even in the absence of a judicially enforceable remedy.
Furthermore, as the Court also observed, there are several avenues
for judicial enforcement of whatever rights Congress may create with
respect to state taxation of electronic commerce under its Article I
powers. As the Court observed in Alden, there is no constitutional bar
to an action brought by the United States in federal or state court to
vindicate these rights, and Congress could surely authorize such suits in
any legislation directed to state taxation of electronic commerce.
Moreover, private litigants can sue state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce federal rights in federal or state court without
treading on state sovereign immunity from suit.164
More importantly, however, is the simple fact that states have generally consented to be sued in their courts with respect to state tax
controversies.165 Consequently, in most instances at least, taxpayers will
162. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2202 (1999).
163. Id. at 2266.
164. See General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
165. Indeed, it is for this reason that the question of state sovereign immunity in tax cases
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be able to vindicate whatever federal rights Congress may create pursuant to its commerce power under existing state remedial procedures.
This is precisely what happens today when taxpayers sue in state court
to vindicate their rights under such federal statutes as Public Law 86272.166 In short, there does not appear to be a legitimate concern that
private litigants will be without a judicial remedy to enforce whatever
substantive rules Congress may create under its commerce power with
respect to electronic commerce.
Finally, and most importantly, Congress could address this issue by
requiring the states to waive their immunity from suit in return for a
relaxation of existing dormant Commerce Clause restraints on jurisdiction to impose sales and use tax collection obligations. The Court has
recognized “a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which
Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent
with federal interests.”167 For example, “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds,”168 it may “offer States the choice
of regulating . . . activity according to federal standards or having state
law preempted by federal regulation,”169 and it may employ “any other
permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy
choices.”170
has arisen in federal rather than state court. See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 119 S.
Ct. 1180, 1184 (1999) (dismissing contention that Eleventh Amendment bars U.S. Supreme
Court review of tax refund suit initiated in state court); McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 28 (1990) (same). Moreover, because of the Tax
Injunction Act, which provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State,” 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1993), state tax cases may
only rarely be maintained in federal court. It is worth noting, however, that in the one context
in which Congress has purported to create federal jurisdiction over state tax issues, namely,
with respect to discriminatory taxation of rail and motor carriers, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 11501(b),
14502 (1997), there is currently considerable controversy over the question of whether such
purported abrogation of state sovereign immunity is an appropriate exercise of Congress’s
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah, 198
F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 1999); Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 141 F.3d 88
(3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 324 (1999); Oregon Short Line R.R. v. Department of
Revenue, 139 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
166. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
167. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
168. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (spending power permits Congress to condition highway funds on states’ adoption of minimum drinking age).
169. New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
170. Id. at 168.
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Accordingly, Congress could condition the congressional overruling of Quill on the states’ consent to suit for enforcement of whatever
other rules Congress may provide limiting the states’ power to tax
electronic commerce. This should allay any concern about creating a
right without a remedy. Moreover, such a requirement would satisfy
the constitutional requirement of an “effective waiver”—the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”171
B. Due Process Clause Considerations
In addition to arguing that Congress lacks the power under the
Commerce Clause to fashion a broad solution to the problem of state
taxation of electronic commerce, one might also contend that such
legislation would purport to authorize violations of the Court’s due
process doctrine and that, unlike Congress’s power to consent to what
otherwise would be violations of the Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, Congress lacks the authority to consent to due
process violations. The question must be answered in two parts. First,
would the congressional legislation authorize violations of the Due
Process Clause and, if so, does Congress have the power to eliminate
the due process bar?
The answer to the first part of the question depends on whether a
state would have the “definite link” or “minimum connection” that
the Due Process Clause requires “between a state and the person,
property or transaction it seeks to tax.”172 The Court in Quill construed this requirement to remove any condition that the “link” or
“connection” be physical: “The requirements of due process are met
irrespective of a corporation’s lack of physical presence in [a] State.”173
What is required is that the out-of-state taxpayer “purposefully direct”
its activities towards residents of the taxing state.174
Whether the congressional legislation would satisfy this criterion
would, of course, depend on the precise nexus requirements in the federal legislation and on the particular facts of the case. In other words,
even if the legislation authorized states to require collection of use

171. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2229 (1999) (citation omitted).
172. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
173. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992).
174. Id.
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taxes that, in some circumstances, would exceed state power under existing due process doctrine, the statute would arguably be invalid only
in those circumstances. It would not provide a basis for attacking the
legislation on its face, since in most of its applications it would likely be
unobjectionable.
Even assuming that, in some circumstances, congressional legislation might authorize the exercise of state taxing power that exceeds
state authority under the Due Process Clause, it is an open question
whether such legislation would nevertheless be sustained. The Court in
dicta has declared that “while Congress has plenary power to regulate
commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that
burden interstate commerce . . . it does not similarly have the power to
authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.”175 Nevertheless, a
strong case can be made that Congress has power to consent to violations of the Due Process Clause so long as they are not restraints by
which Congress itself is bound.176 Under this theory, Congress can
authorize what would otherwise be federalism-based violations of the
Due Process Clause but not Due Process violations of individual rights.
In the end, it seems unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court would
hold that the framers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment left the nation powerless, short of a constitutional amendment, to
legislate an administratively workable solution to the problem of state
taxation of electronic commerce, despite the joint exercise by Congress
and the states of their respective powers under the Constitution.177
175. Id. at 305; see also id. at 318; ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S.
307, 350 n.14 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
176. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1983). See also William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975).
177. As Professor Donald Regan, an eminent constitutional scholar, has put it:
The crucial question then becomes: Can Congress overturn Supreme Court decisions invalidating state laws on grounds of extra-territoriality? It is an understatement to say there is no settled doctrine on this question. Nonetheless, I would confidently expect the Court to hold that Congress can overturn most, if not all, such
decisions, precisely because extra-territoriality is more a matter of federalism than of
fundamental fairness.
Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987 and the Equity in Interstate Competition Act of 1987:
Hearings on H.R. 1242, H.R. 1891, and H.R. 3521 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong. 708 (1989) (letter from Donald H. Regan to Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives regarding the “Constitutionality of H.R. 3521 and Similar Bills Authorizing States to Require Tax Collection by Mail-
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Moreover, even if portions of such legislation were held to violate the
Due Process Clause as applied, the lion’s share of any such legislation
would be invulnerable to due process attack on its face or as applied.
C. Concluding Observations Regarding the Scope of Congressional
Power to Address State Taxation of Electronic Commerce
Congress possesses ample power to forge a comprehensive solution to the problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce.
There is no doubt that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to legislate with respect to virtually any aspect of electronic commerce. It may restrict the states’ power to tax such commerce in ways that Congress finds burdensome, prescribe the precise
conditions under which states may tax such commerce, and permit
the states to tax such commerce in ways that the Commerce Clause
currently forbids. Although Congress may not create federal or state
jurisdiction over nonconsenting states to enforce whatever rights it
may create under legislation addressed to electronic commerce, the
states’ courthouses are generally open for the vindication of such
rights. Congress could insist that the states waive their sovereign
immunity to suit in return for a relaxation of the Commerce Clause
restraints on their power to tax remote sellers. There is an open
question whether Congress may override any due process limitations
on state taxing power, but, even if it may not, these restraints are not
extensive and, in any event, would likely affect any broad-based legislation only in limited circumstances on an “as applied” basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce
have spawned an enormous amount of interest in—and controversy
over—the possibility of making dramatic changes in the states’ existing sales and use tax regimes. We are hopeful that salutary reforms
will emerge from this ongoing process, whose formative stages we
have examined in this article. Nevertheless, it remains unclear in the
final analysis whether the NTA Project Report or the ACEC recommendations will be the catalyst for meaningful change or will be consigned to the dustbin of history, as have most previous efforts to re-

Order Sellers); see also Jerome R. Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments During
the Past Half Century, 39 VAND. L. REV. 961, 986-92 (1986).
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solve the problems of state taxation of interstate commerce through
federal legislation rather than litigation.
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